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Prior to 1972, virtually all death penalty statutes in the United
States allowed the sentencer, once guilt for a capital offense had been
established, absolute discretion to impose the death penalty or some
lesser punishment.' Such discretion was initially thought to provide for a
more just and humane system than the mandatory death statutes that
had prevailed in the United States at the turn of the century, under
which the imposition of death was automatic upon conviction for certain
crimes.' The discretionary statutes were also thought to ensure greater
reliability of convictions than the mandatory schemes, under which juries
often had declined to convict a defendant simply because they knew he3
would be executed, and they thought the death penalty would be too
extreme.4
However, in practice it became apparent that vesting absolute sen-
tencing discretion in the jury had an undesirable side-effect: It resulted
in radically inconsistent sentencing decisions, apparently based as much
upon prejudice and caprice as upon the facts and circumstances of each
case.' As a result, in 1972 the Supreme Court held, in Furman v. Geor-
* B.A., 1982, University of North Carolina; J.D., 1990, New York University; Associ-
ate, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom. I would like to thank the following people for
providing variously their critical comments and suggestions, useful factual material, research
and general support: Patsy Morris, Ronald J. Tabak, George H. Kendall, Margaret Vandiver,
William J. Bowers, Clive A. Stafford Smith, Michael L. Radelet, Julian H. Wright, Jr., An-
nette L. Hurst and Cecelia M. Cooper. Finally, special thanks to Verina Wilkins for her su-
perb word processing and organizational assistance.
1. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 291-93 (1976) (plurality opinion) (dis-
cussing gradual abolition of mandatory death penalty schemes in United States).
2. Id. at 292-99.
3. It is the policy of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review to use gender neutral lan-
guage. However, the Review has chosen to respect the author's preferences in this regard,
based on the fact that the vast majority of capital defendants and death row inmates are males.
4. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 293; see also Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 85 n.13 (1987)
(discussing jury nullification under mandatory sentencing statutes).
5. See generally Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 249-57, 250 n.15 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (discretionary death penalty statutes selectively applied by juries are means of
perpetuating racial discrimination).
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gia,6 that the application of the death penalty under the then-existing
statutes was unconstitutionally arbitrary and capricious.7 In the now fa-
miliar words of Justice White, there was "no meaningful basis for distin-
guishing the few cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in
which it is not."' Thus, every death penalty statute in the United States
was struck down, and 558 death row inmates had their sentences com-
muted to life imprisonment. 9
Furman did not, however, hold that the death penalty was per se
unconstitutional, and those states that wished to continue utilizing it
were left with the task of fashioning statutes that would avoid the
problems identified in Furman. Those states followed basically two
paths. Some, like Florida, Georgia and Texas, enacted new statutes that
provided guidance to the judge or jury in making the sentencing deci-
sion. 10 These "guided discretion" statutes, which required a finding of
certain aggravating factors before the death penalty could be imposed,
and which allowed presentation of aggravating and mitigating evidence
in a separate sentencing proceeding, were upheld by the Supreme Court
in 1976.11 Other states, like Louisiana and North Carolina, enacted stat-
utes that attempted to avoid the problems identified in Furman by once
again making death mandatory for certain crimes.12 Holding that
6. 408 U.S. 238 (per curiam).
7. Id. at 239-40. In some states, death penalty statutes already had been declared uncon-
stitutional under state constitutional provisions analogous to the Eighth Amendment. The
California Supreme Court, for example, struck California's death penalty statute prior to
Furman on the ground that it violated article I, § 6 of the California Constitution's prohibition
of "cruel or unusual punishments." People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 656-57, 493 P.2d 880,
899, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, 171, cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972).
8. Furman, 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring); see also id. at 310 (Stewart, J., con-
curring) (concluding that "the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the inflic-
tion of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so
wantonly and so freakishly imposed").
9. For an interesting account of the ultimate fate of those 558 inmates, see James W.
Marquart & Jonathan R. Sorensen, A National Study of the Furman-Commuted Inmates: As-
sessing the Threat to Society From Capital Offenders, 23 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 5 (1989).
10. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (West 1985 & Supp. 1992); GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 27-2534.1, -2537, -2538 (Harrison 1988); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31 (West Supp.
1992). In response to Furman, "roughly two-thirds of the States promptly redrafted their
capital sentencing statutes in an effort to limit jury discretion and avoid arbitrary and inconsis-
tent results." Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 44 (1984); see also Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S.
66, 70-72 (1987) (discussing general history of death penalty legislation in years following
Furman).
11. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion); see also Pulley, 465 U.S. at 53 (upholding
California's post-Anderson/post-Furman death penalty statute).
12. See, e.g., 1973 La. Acts 218 (codified as amended at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30
(West Supp. 1992)), cited in Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 331 (1976); 1973 N.C. Laws
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mandatory death penalty statutes could no longer comport with existing
standards of decency, the Supreme Court struck these statutes in 1976 on
the ground that they were inconsistent with the Eighth Amendment.1
3
As a result of these holdings and the legislation that followed them, some
thirty-six states and the federal system currently have death penalty
statutes. 14
The Supreme Court's decisions during the 1970s reflect a pro-
foundly difficult struggle over whether the death penalty is an acceptable
form of punishment in a civilized society.15 With that question appar-
ently resolved by the Court's 1976 decisions, the ensuing years have wit-
nessed an increasingly complex struggle over much narrower questions
concerning the specific circumstances under which, and the procedures
by which, the penalty may constitutionally be imposed. The Court's cap-
ital punishment decisions during this latter period have focused on a
wide range of issues, such as: the types of crimes for which death may be
imposed; 16 the role of particular aggravating circumstances as predicates
2d Sess. 323 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Supp. 1991)), cited in Wood-
son v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 286 (1976) (plurality opinion).
13. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
280 (1976) (plurality opinion). In Roberts and Woodson, the Court held that the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments prohibit mandatory death penalty statutes because they lack guide-
lines for jury discretion and are inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency. Rob-
erts, 428 U.S. at 335-36; Woodson, 428 U.S. at 301-02. As a result, there is "no meaningful
appellate review of the jury's decision." Roberts, 428 U.S. at 335-36. Notwithstanding the
Court's decisions in Roberts and Woodson, the question apparently remained as to whether a
mandatory death statute for the murder of a police officer could be justified. The Court held
that such a mandatory sentence violated the Eighth Amendment in Roberts v. Louisiana, 431
U.S. 633 (1977). For another decade, the question remained whether a mandatory death stat-
ute for murder committed while serving the maximum available non-death sentence of life
without parole would violate the Eighth Amendment. That question was finally answered
affirmatively in Sumner. 483 U.S. at 77-78.
14. See infra note 198. As of November 1, 1992, a total of 2636 inmates were under
sentence of death in those 36 jurisdictions. See NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, DEATH
Row, U.S.A., Fall 1992, at 1, 1.
15. See Stephen Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L. Rlv. 1, 8-12 (1980). Taking
into account all nine opinions, Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam), appears
to be the longest single decision the Supreme Court has ever written. The 1972 and 1976 death
penalty decisions alone generated 475 pages in the United States Reports, and gave rise to
sharp and bitter disagreements among the Justices. No other single issue, including abortion,
has occupied so much of the Court's time or generated so many opinions during the last two
decades. See infra notes 16-29.
16. See, eg., Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 137-38 (1987) (reckless indifference may
constitute sufficient level of intent to justify imposition of death penalty for murder); Enmund
v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788-801 (1982) (death penalty may not be imposed for mere partici-
pation in crime in which murder was committed when defendant did not intend or anticipate
that killing would occur or that force would be used); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592
(1977) (death penalty may not be imposed for crime of rape).
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for imposition of the death penalty;17 the effect of racial discrimination
on the capital trial;II the proper evidence that the sentencer may or must
consider; 9 who may make the sentencing decision;20 the application of
17. See, eg., Espinosa v. Florida, 112S. Ct. 2926, 2929 (1992) (if both trial judge and jury
participate in sentencing under statute requiring sentencer to "weigh" aggravating against mit-
igating factors, neither may weigh invalid aggravating factor); Stringer v. Black, 112 S. Ct.
1130, 1135-38 (1992) (Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988), and Clemons v. Missis-
sippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990), did not announce new rule of law, and therefore habeas petitioner
whose sentence became final before those cases were decided is not precluded from relying on
them); Shell v. Mississippi, 111 S. Ct. 313, 313 (1990) (Mississippi's "especially heinous, atro-
cious, or cruel" aggravating factor was unconstitutional as applied); Lewis v. Jeffers, 110 S. Ct.
3092, 3100-02 (1990) (Arizona's "especially heinous, cruel or depraved" aggravating factor
was not unconstitutional on its face or as applied); Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 744-
45 (1990) (under statute that requires sentencer to "weigh" aggravating against mitigating
factors, invalidity of one aggravating factor renders sentence unconstitutional; however, state
appellate court may "reweigh" aggravating and mitigating factors, make findings of fact and
affirm death sentence); Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 360 (1988) (Oklahoma's "espe-
cially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravating factor was unconstitutional as applied by
Oklahoma courts); Wainwright.v. Goode, 464 U.S. 78, 86-87 (1983) (trial judge did not im-
properly consider nonstatutory aggravating circumstance); Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939,
957-58 (1983) (sentencer may consider nonstatutory aggravating circumstance, and state ap-
pellate court may apply harmless error analysis to use of aggravating factors that violated state
law); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 890 (1983) (invalidity of one of two aggravating factors
does not invalidate death sentence under statute that requires only one aggravating factor to
impose death and does not require sentencer to "weigh" aggravating against mitigating fac-
tors); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980) (plurality opinion) (Georgia's "outra-
geously or wantonly vile" aggravating factor unconstitutional as applied; state appellate court
must give narrow construction of such factor for it to remain constitutional).
18. See, eg., Ford v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 850, 856-58 (1991) (capital defendant's objection
to racial discrimination in jury selection preserved claim under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
79 (1986), even though Batson had not yet been decided; state appellate court may not bar
claim on grounds it was raised only under earlier case of Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202
(1965), not Batson, because Swain and Batson differ only as to proof required, not as to nature
of claim); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 312-13 (1987) (evidence of pattern of racial
discrimination in capital sentencing was insufficient basis upon which to raise constitutional
issue).
19. See, eg., Dawson v. Delaware, 112 S. Ct. 1093, 1097 (1992) (evidence of defendant's
membership in "Aryan Brotherhood" prison group may not be admitted at penalty phase of
capital trial if there was no evidence of unlawful or violent activity); Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S.
Ct. 2597, 2608 (1991) (prosecutor may present evidence and argument regarding victim and
harm to victim's family during sentencing phase of death penalty trial), overruling South Caro-
lina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 810-12 (1989) (prosecutor improperly commented on victim's
personal characteristics in urging death sentence), and Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 509
(1987) (victim impact evidence may not be admitted at sentencing phase of capital trial); John-
son v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 585-86 (1987) (introduction of prior conviction as evidence in
aggravation renders death sentence unconstitutional when prior conviction is shown to have
been invalid); Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 398-99 (1987) (sentencer may not be fore-
closed from considering and may not refuse to consider nonstatutory mitigating factors); Skip-
per v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (defendant must be allowed to introduce mitigating
evidence regarding good behavior in jail); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115-17 (1982)
(sentencer may not refuse to consider proper evidence offered in mitigation); Estelle v. Smith,
451 U.S. 454, 468-69 (1981) (evidence of psychiatric examination may not be admitted at
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the Double Jeopardy Clause to a capital sentencing hearing;2" the charge
the trial court may or must give the sentencing jury;22 the types of
prosecutorial closing arguments that are permissible in a capital case;23
capital trial if defendant was not advised of Fifth Amendment rights before examination);
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978) (sentencer may not be precluded from consider-
ing evidence in mitigation when it relates to defendant's character, record or circumstances of
offense); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362 (1977) (sentencer may not consider aggravating
evidence that defendant had no opportunity to rebut or explain).
20. See, e.g., Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047, 3055 (1990) (statute requiring court, not
jury, to make findings of aggravating and mitigating factors, and to impose death where former
outweigh latter, does not infringe Sixth Amendment because jury sentencing is not required);
Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638, 640-41 (1989) (statute requiring "advisory" jury verdict, but
also requiring judge to make separate findings of aggravating and mitigating circumstances,
and to determine sentence, does not violate Sixth Amendment); Baldwin v. Alabama, 472 U.S.
372, 389 (1985) (statute requiring jury to return mandatory death "sentence" on conviction for
capital offense, but also requiring separate sentencing hearing in which judge weighs aggravat-
ing and mitigating circumstances and makes independent sentencing decision, does not violate
Constitution); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 457-65 (1984) (plurality opinion) (jury sen-
tencing is not required by Eighth or Sixth Amendments).
21. See, eg., Poland v. Arizona, 476 U.S. 147, 156-57 (1986) (double jeopardy does not
apply if sentencer relied on single invalid aggravating factor in sentencing defendant to death;
because there was no "acquittal" of death penalty, defendant may be resentenced on basis of
another aggravating factor); Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984) (where sentencing
judge misconstrued meaning of statutory aggravating circumstance, and as result found it in-
applicable and sentenced defendant to life, defendant may not thereafter be sentenced to
death); Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 446 (1981) (if defendant is'sentenced to life im-
prisonment and conviction is reversed upon appeal, Double Jeopardy Clause is violated if de-
fendant is sentenced to death at retrial because first trial "acquitted" defendant of death
penalty).
22. See, eg., McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 444 (1990) (jury instruction requir-
ing unanimity on mitigating factors impermissibly limits consideration of mitigating evidence);
Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 377 (1990) (instruction that jury "shall impose" death if it
finds that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances is not unconstitu-
tional); Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 305-08 (1990) (jury instruction that required
verdict of death upon finding of at least one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating cir-
cumstances is not unconstitutional); Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 175-76 (1988) (capital
defendant is not entitled to penalty phase instruction that would give effect to jury's "residual
doubt" as to guilt); Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 384 (1988) (jury may not be instructed
that it must unanimously agree on mitigating circumstances); Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S.
231, 241 (1988) ("Allen charge" is permissible in sentencing phase of capital trial); California
v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 541-43 (1987) (instruction that jurors may not be swayed by senti-
ment, sympathy or similar emotions in making sentencing decision is not unconstitutional);
Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 315-18 (1985) (plurality opinion) (jury instruction may not
place burden on defendant as to question of intent); California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1013-
14 (1983) (Constitution does not prohibit jury instruction that governor may commute alterna-
tive sentence of life without parole); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637-38 (1980) (jury in
guilt phase of capital case must be instructed on lesser included offense if supported by
evidence).
23. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2609 (1991) (prosecutor may present
argument regarding victim and harm to victim's family during sentencing phase of death pen-
alty trial); see also Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 178-83 (1986) (condemning prosecu-
tor's closing argument, which, inter alia, referred to defendant as "animal" and stated the
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the categories of persons who constitutionally may be executed; 24 the de-
fendant's mental state or competence to stand trial;25 the capital jury
selection process; 6 the appellate review process;2 7 the availability of fed-
prosecutor's personal desire to see defendant dead, but holding that defendant nonetheless had
fair trial); Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 323 (1985) (prosecutor may not argue to
sentencing jury that it is not final decision maker as to sentence of death).
24. See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (Constitution does not bar
execution of youthful offenders 16 years of age); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989)
(Constitution does not bar execution of mentally retarded, although sentencer must be allowed
to consider mental retardation as mitigating factor); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815,
838 (1988) (plurality opinion) (execution of 15-year-old offender impermissible in this case);
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 401 (1986) (Constitution does not allow execution of the
insane).
25. See, eg., Medina v. California, 112 S. Ct. 2572,2576-81 (1992) (capital defendant claim-
ing incompetence to stand trial may be required to prove incompetence by preponderance of
evidence); Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810, 1815-17 (1992) (capital conviction and sentence
reversed because defendant was forced to take antipsychotic drugs during trial); Satterwhite v.
Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 258 (1988) (psychiatric evidence obtained by examining defendant with-
out adequate notice to defense counsel may not be used at sentencing hearing of capital case);
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 80-84 (1985) (where indigent capital defendant places his san-
ity in issue, due process requires that he be given access to assistance of a psychiatrist); Estelle
v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 468-71 (1981) (privilege against self-incrimination and right to counsel
apply to pretrial psychiatric examinations if results of examinations are to be used by State at
capital sentencing hearing).
26. See, eg., Morgan v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 2222, 2232-33 (1992) (jurors who are unalter-
ably in favor of death penalty are not "impartial" and must be excused for cause, and defend-
ant may inquire whether juror would automatically vote for death upon conviction); Mu'Min
v. Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 1899, 1908 (1991) (refusal to allow capital defendant to inquire into
content of media reports heard or read by prospective jurors did not violate Sixth Amend-
ment); Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 84-85 (1988) (trial court's failure to remove juror for
cause is error because juror stated he would vote for death automatically upon conviction);
Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 176-84 (1986) (removal of jurors opposed to death penalty
does not violate right to impartial jury despite petitioner's allegations that such juries are
"prosecution prone" and more likely to convict); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985)
(juror must be removed for cause if juror's views on capital punishment would "'prevent or
substantially impair the performance of his duties'" (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45
(1980)); Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 50-51 (1980) (jurors may not be excluded because of
conscientious scruples about death penalty under statute that requires judge to impose sen-
tence based on jury's findings); Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122, 123 (1976) (per curiam) (unless
potential juror is irrevocably committed to vote against death penalty regardless of facts that
might emerge at trial, juror may not be excused for cause); see also Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391
U.S. 510, 518 (1968) (State may inquire during voir dire whether jurors are so opposed to
capital punishment as to be unable to vote for death penalty, but jurors may not be excused
simply because they have conscientious scruples against death penalty).
27. Sochor v. Florida, 112 S. Ct. 2114, 2122-23 (1992) (state appellate court did not ade-
quately "reweigh" mitigating and'aggravating circumstances, or conduct harmless error analy-
sis, after determining that trial court considered invalid aggravating factor); Parker v. Dugger,
111 S. Ct. 731, 739-40 (1991) (state appellate court may not affirm death sentence based on
mischaracterization of factual determinations made by trial court and sentencer); Whitmore v.
Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 164-66 (1990) (if one death row inmate waives right to appellate
review, another death row inmate does not have standing to proceed on first inmate's behalf as
"next friend," suggesting there is no actual requirement that state appellate courts review
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eral collateral review;2" and other issues concerning the procedures used
in imposing a sentence of death.29
Recently, however, attention has focused once again on the sen-
tences themselves. In particular, over the last few years there has been
an increasing and very practical concern over the non-death alternatives
available in a capital case. Significantly, this concern has come not so
much from critics of the death penalty, although commentators have cer-
tainly taken note of it,30 as from those who must actually deal with the
system-that is, courts, 31 legislatures 32 and, as this Article will show,
death sentences); Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 389-92 (1986) (appellate court may make
findings of fact required under Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982)); Pulley v. Harris, 465
U.S. 37, 50 (1984) (state appellate court is not required to conduct proportionality analysis
comparing appellant's crime with other crimes for which death has been imposed).
28. Many of the Supreme Court's most important decisions in death penalty cases have
concerned the scope of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction. Those decisions have progressively
limited that jurisdiction, and with it, the ability of the federal courts to review a state death
row inmate's federal constitutional claims. See, e.g., Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct.
1715, 1719-21 (1992) ("cause-and-prejudice standard" governs question of whether defendant
waived federal constitutional claim by not raising it in state court proceedings); Gomez v.
District Court, 112 S. Ct. 1652, 1653 (1992) (per curiam) (claim that execution by cyanide was
cruel and unusual punishment was waived when not presented in earlier federal habeas corpus
petitions). In addition, a number of significant non-death cases have served to limit the availa-
bility of the federal courts to state death row inmates. This topic, and the numerous cases it
involves, has been extensively addressed in recent literature. See, e.g., Ronald J. Tabak & J.
Mark Lane, Judicial Activism and Legislative "Reform" of Federal Habeas Corpus: A Critical
Analysis of Recent Developments and Current Proposals, 55 ALB. L. REv. 1 (1991); John
Blume & William Pratt, Understanding Teague v. Lane, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE
325 (1991); Steven M. Goldstein, Chipping Away at the Great Writ: Will Death Sentenced
Federal Habeas Corpus Petitioners Be Able to Seek and Utilize Changes in the Law?, 18 N.Y.U.
REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 357 (1991).
29. See, ag., Lankford v. Idaho, Ill S. Ct. 1723, 1733 (1991) (death sentence may not be
imposed if defendant was not given adequate notice of possibility of such sentence to allow
presentation of mitigating factors); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-96 (1984)
(establishing standard for constitutionally effective assistance of counsel in capital cases); Dob-
bert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 297-98 (1977) (no ex post facto violation if defendant is sen-
tenced to death under statute enacted after crime, if statute in place at time of crime provided
for death for that crime but was subsequently held unconstitutional); see also Heckler v. Cha-
ney, 470 U.S. 821, 835-37 (1975) (FDA's refusal to conduct enforcement proceedings regard-
ing allegedly unlawful use of drugs in lethal injection executions is not reviewable by federal
judiciary).
30. See, eg., Marshall Dayan et al., Searching for an Impartial Sentencer Through Jury
Selection in Capital Trials, 23 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 151 (1989); Anthony Paduano & Clive A.
Stafford Smith, Deathly Errors: Juror Misperceptions Concerning Parole in the Imposition of
the Death Penalty, 18 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 211 (1987); William W. Hood, III, Note,
The Meaning of "Life"for Virginia Jurors and Its Effect on Reliability in Capital Sentencing,
75 VA. L. REv. 1605 (1989); Julian H. Wright, Jr., Note, Life-Without-Parole: An Alternative
to Death or Not Much of a Life at All?, 43 VAND. L. REv. 529 (1990).
31. See, e.g., Knox v. Collins, 928 F.2d 657 (5th Cir. 1991); King v. Lynaugh, 850 F.2d
1055 (5th Cir. 1988), cert denied, 488 U.S. 1019 (1989); Andrade v. McCotter, 805 F.2d 1190
(5th Cir. 1986); Bruce v. State, 569 A.2d 1254 (Md. 1990); Doering v. State, 545 A.2d 1281
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jurors. Although approached from a variety of differing perspectives,
such concern raises the question of whether a traditional life sentence,
with the possibility of parole, provides a satisfactory alternative to the
death penalty.
This Article provides a further exploration of that general topic.
Part I presents empirical evidence that capital sentencing juries are
highly dissatisfied with a proceeding that offers, as sentencing alterna-
tives, only the death penalty or life with the possibility of parole. 3 As a
result, that section shows, juries frequently choose death, not because
they think it is the appropriate sentence, but because they do not believe
that the life-sentence alternative will adequately ensure the defendant's
incarceration. In light of the material presented in part I, part II sug-
gests that a capital punishment scheme that does not provide a perma-
nent-incarceration alternative is inconsistent with the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments. 34 In order to avoid these infirmities, this Arti-
cle concludes that death penalty schemes must provide an alternative
sentence with at least two general components: First, such an alternative
must ensure incarceration for life; and, second, it must require that the
sentencer have a clear and accurate understanding as to the exact mean-
ing of each of the available sentencing alternatives.
I. JURIES FREQUENTLY IMPOSE DEATH SENTENCES TO AVOID THE
POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE FROM A LIFE SENTENCE
Several commentators have observed that capital sentencing juries
sometimes return death verdicts simply because they fear that, if a life
sentence is returned instead, the defendant will become eligible for-and
possibly be released on-parole after a short term of years.3" To date,
however, little empirical data has been offered in support of that sugges-
tion. This section attempts to partially fill that void by examining a spe-
cific universe of cases-all post-Furman Georgia death penalty cases
through 1990-for indicators of that concern and its impact on jury de-
(Md. 1988); Berry v. State, 575 So. 2d 1 (Miss. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2042 (1991);
Petrocelli v. State, 692 P.2d 503 (Nev. 1985); State v. Johnson, 698 S.W.2d 631 (Tenn. 1985),
cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1130 (1986); Rose v. State, 752 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987);
State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 584 (Utah 1987) (Durham, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part); Clanton v. Commonwealth, 286 S.E.2d 172 (Va. 1972).
32. See infra notes 198-202 and accompanying text for a discussion of states that have
enacted legislation creating extended life-sentence alternatives in capital cases.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 35-98.
34. See infra text accompanying notes 99-208.
35. See Paduano & Stafford Smith, supra note 30, at 211-30; Hood, supra note 30, at 1624-
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cisions. As discussed below, such an examination confirms that the pos-
sibility of parole from a life sentence-or at least the belief in such a
possibility- operates as a "silent aggravating circumstance" in many
capital sentencing proceedings, and often may be the decisive factor un-
derlying a jury's decision to sentence a defendant to death.36
A. Jury Questions About Parole: A Study of the Post-Furman
Georgia Cases
Capital sentencing juries often indicate their concern about the sen-
tencing alternatives by asking questions, during the sentencing phase of
the trial, about the defendant's potential eligibility for parole if sentenced
to life imprisonment. 37 In an effort to determine how often such ques-
tions occur, the author reviewed the transcripts of every Georgia trial in
which a death penalty was returned by a jury from 1973, when Georgia
began prosecutions under its newly-enacted, post-Furman statute,38
through the end of 1990. This study revealed that sentencing juries
asked questions about the defendant's potential eligibility for parole from
a life sentence in twenty-five percent of all relevant cases.39 Specifically,
of the 280 trials reviewed, seventy of the resulting death penalties were
returned following jury questions to the court regarding the nature of the
36. State courts occasionally have recognized that sentencing juries will attempt to com-
pensate for the possibility of parole by setting the sentence higher than they actually believe is
appropriate. See, eg., Smith v. State, 317 A.2d 20, 25-26 (Del. 1974); State v. White, 142 A.2d
65, 75-77 (N.J. 1958); Farris v. State, 535 S.W.2d 608, 614 (Tenn. 1976). Additionally, in a
death penalty case, fear of release on parole may be accompanied by the fairly common as-
sumption that the death sentence, even if imposed at trial, will not actually be carried out.
This assumption is sometimes referred to as the "Slovik Syndrome," in reference to the execu-
tion of U.S. Army Private Eddie Slovik, who was sentenced to death in 1944 for desertion. See
Jon 0. Newman, Foreword to Project, Parole Release Decisionmaking and the Sentencing Pro-
cess, 84 YALE L.J. 810, 812-13 (1975).
37. This should not be particularly surprising. As one commentator has observed: "Com-
mon sense suggests that virtually any person given the responsibility of determining whether a
convicted murderer should be condemned to death or sentenced instead to life imprisonment
would want information about what 'life' imprisonment really means." Hood, supra note 30,
at 1620-21.
38. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 196-207 (1976) (plurality opinion) (approving
Georgia's post-Furman death penalty scheme).
39. This study involved the review of every Georgia trial during the 17-year period in
which a death sentence was returned by a jury, and for which transcripts were available.
Although there were 288 death sentences imposed in Georgia during this period, eight were
imposed by the trial judge because the defendant waived jury sentencing. These cases were not
included in the overall sample. Additionally, in four cases the trial judge rejected the jury's
verdict and imposed a life sentence. These decisions were not appealed, and no transcripts
were available. For purposes of this study, these latter four cases were assumed not to have
involved a jury question. See infra app. I.
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life sentence alternative and the possibility of release therefrom.' Be-
cause juries are not necessarily informed of their right to ask questions,
this figure probably represents a very conservative estimate of the extent
of jury concern over parole in capital trials.4 1 As one commentator has
noted, "[i]t cannot be said... that the possibility of parole is not being
considered in those cases where a question is not posed .... It appears
likely that in all but the most extraordinarily heinous capital murder
case, parole is a factor in the jury's deliberations." '
The questions that juries ask are remarkably similar from case to
case. Typically, they either send a note to the judge or return to the
courtroom to ask quite directly whether there is a possibility that the
defendant will be released if they sentence him to life imprisonment.
These uniquely consistent inquiries43 indicate that one of the primary
concerns of the capital jury is the ability or willingness of the state to
adequately incapacitate the defendant.' The entire thrust of the prob-
lem is illustrated by one very typical question that the jury presented to
the judge in Willie James Hall's 1989 capital sentencing proceeding4 5--
the jury wanted to know, quite simply: "Is there life without parole?""
40. The 70 jury questions, together with the courts' responses, are set forth in Appendix I.
41. See W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Procedure to be Followed Where Jury Requests Infor-
mation as to Possibility of Pardon orParolefrom Sentence Imposed, 35 A.L.R.2d 769, 771 n.10
(1954) (citihg numerous reported cases with jury questions). "The number of cases in which
the problem has been brought to a head by a request for instructions may raise disturbing
surmises as to the number in which the jury has acted on its own information as to the availa-
bility of pardon or parole in assessing punishment." Id.
42. Paduano & Stafford Smith, supra note 30, at 237 n.91. This point is not questioned by
either "side" of the overall debate about capital punishment. For example, the Prosecuting
Attorney's Council of Georgia stated in its amicus curiae brief in Quick v. State, 353 S.E.2d
497 (Ga. 1987), that the issue of parole "arises in almost every capital sentencing trial." Brief
of the Prosecuting Attorney's Council of Georgia as Amicus Curiae on Behalf of Appellee as
to Enumeration of Error No. Ten at 2, Quick (No. 43584) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles
Law Review).
43. Although other questions were occasionally asked, there was no other subject about
which the juries displayed such a consistent and persistent interest. The only other question
repeated to any degree at all concerned the meaning of the Georgia statutory aggravating
circumstance, known as the "b(7) circumstance," which allows death to be imposed if the jury
finds that the murder was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman in that it
involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim." GA. CODE ANN.
§ 17-10-30(b)(7) (Harrison 1990). However, these questions did not occur as frequently as
questions regarding parole eligibility.
44. As the Prosecuting Attorneys' Brief stated: "In the death penalty sentencing phase,
the primary concern of the jurors seems to be whether the defendant can be restrainedfor life,
if he is spared from execution." Brief of Prosecuting Attorney's Council at 5.
45. Hall v. State, 383 S.E.2d 128, 129 n.1 (Ga. 1989), cert. denied, II S. Ct. 221 (1990).
46. See State v. Hall (Trial Ct. Tr. at 1313-22), reprinted infra app. I at 379.
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The answer to this question is that no sentence of life without parole
currently exists under Georgia law, and a capital defendant sentenced to
life imprisonment typically becomes eligible to be considered for parole
after fifteen years.47 However, even that answer may not be given in re-
sponse to a jury question, because under current law in Georgia,4" and
most other capital punishment states,4 9 sentencing juries may not be
given any information regarding the defendant's potential parole eligibil-
ity under a life sentence.5° Therefore, jury inquiries regarding parole
must remain unanswered, and jurors are left to make their sentencing
decisions completely in the dark as to the meaning of the only alternative
to death the state has chosen to offer.51 More importantly, there is a
total failure to offer the jury any assurance that the defendant, whom
they have already determined to be guilty of aggravated murder, will be
effectively incapacitated by any sentence short of death. The result in
each case is prompt and predictable.52 Once the matter became part of
47. GA. CONST. art. IV, § 2, 2; GA. CODE ANN. § 42-9-39 (Harrison 1990).
48. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-8-76 (Harrison 1990); see also Quick v. State, 353 S.E.2d 497
(Ga. 1987) (affirming validity of Georgia Code § 17-8-76).
49. See Paduano & Stafford Smith, supra note 30, at 216-17 (discussing states that have
such prohibitions); Hood, supra note 30, at 1617-18, 1617 n.1.
50. See, ag., Quick, 353 S.E.2d at 503 ("[D]efendant's parole eligibility is not... an issue
considered by the jury in the sentencing phase of a death penalty case.").
51. To make matters worse, jurors in Georgia and most other states operate under serious
misconceptions regarding an inmate's potential eligibility for parole under a life sentence im-
posed for capital murder. See generally Paduano & Stafford Smith, supra note 30 (discussing
numerous studies showing that jurors incorrectly believe parole will occur after 7 to 10 years).
As Georgia Supreme Court Justice Charles Weltner has observed: "'Everybody believes that
a person sentenced to life for murder will be walking the streets in seven years."' See id. at
213 n.4 (quoting SAVANNAH NEWS PREss, Mar. 23, 1986, at 7C).
52. A short deliberation time following a jury inquiry is highly significant, as the amount
of additional deliberation required after a communication with the trial judge is indicative of
the prejudice caused by the communication. See Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 40
(1975) (fact that jury deliberated for two hours and returned verdict within five minutes after
communication with court "strongly suggests that the trial judge's response may have induced
unanimity"). Although most of the Georgia capital trial transcripts reviewed did not indicate
the actual time elapsed between the jury communication and the final verdict, those transcripts
that included such times indicate that the intervals were quite short. See the following cases,
transcripts of which are on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review: Stanley Allen (35
minutes between parole question and death verdict) (Trial Ct. Tr. at 435-40); N. Brown (15
minutes) (Trial Ct. Tr. at 501-02); Robert Lewis Collier (less than one hour) (Trial Ct. Tr. at
1440); Samuel Gibson, III (15 minutes) (Trial Ct. Tr. at 434); William Henry Hance (second
trial) (40 minutes) (Trial Ct. Tr. at 1379-84); Michael Miller (15 minutes) (Trial Ct. Tr. Vol. 2
at 452-53); James Randall Rogers (second trial) (34 minutes) (Trial Ct. Tr. at 2169); Donald
Wayne Thomas (38 minutes) (Trial Ct. Tr. at 569-70).
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the deliberations,5 3 and the jury was unable to obtain the assurances it
sought, "[t]he death sentence was a foregone conclusion."5 4
B. Jury Interviews: The Impact of Parole Considerations on Capital
Sentencing Decisions
The full effect of jury concern over parole has, in some cases, been
more fully revealed by juror statements made after the trial. An enlight-
ening example is the 1985 trial of James Randall Rogers.5 5 At the sen-
tencing stage of the trial, the jury returned from deliberations to ask the
judge about Rogers' potential eligibility for parole if given a life sen-
tence.5 6 In compliance with Georgia law,57 the judge refused to answer
the question, and instructed the jury not to consider parole in its sentenc-
ing deliberations.58 The jury returned a death verdict thirty-four minutes
after this unsuccessful inquiry. 9
Post-trial jury interviews, ordered by the court for unrelated rea-
sons,60 revealed that concern over parole formed a substantial part-if
53. How the parole issue becomes part of the jury's deliberations is, of course, not always
subject to precise determination. Prosecutors sometimes find a way to indirectly allude to
parole in their closing arguments. But the more likely source of this concern is simply the
widespread public perception that parole is too often and too early granted, a perception fueled
by almost constant media reports on the subject. This includes, in many cases, very misleading
information, such as the fact that Charles Manson, who will almost certainly not be released,
periodically "comes up for parole." See James A. Fox et al., Death Penalty Opinion in the
Post-Furman Years, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 499, 513 (1991).
54. Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 78 (1987).
55. See Rogers v. State, 344 S.E.2d 644 (Ga. 1986) (affirming Rogers' conviction and
death sentence on direct appeal). The author's initial study of Georgia trial transcripts, an
extended version of which is discussed in this Article, was conducted in connection with post-
conviction proceedings in the Rogers case. The Rogers case is one of the 70 included in Ap-
pendix I.,
56. During the sentencing deliberations, the jury asked the court: "Does life imprison-
ment mean Mr. Rogers would be eligible for parole in seven years or less on good behavior?"
See infra app. I at 385.
57. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
58. The court's recharge admonished the jury that it was only to consider the two alterna-
tives provided by the state: life imprisonment or death, and that "[y]ou are not to concern
yourself with the repercussions of either punishment that you fix." See infra app. I at 385.
59. Id.
60. The jury interviews in Rogers' case were ordered to determine whether an improper
communication had occurred between a bailiff and a juror, and if so, whether any prejudice
may have resulted to the defendant from the communication. Rogers v. State, 344 S.E.2d 644,
650 (Ga. 1986). The interviewer did not inquire specifically about parole, but the jurors raised
the issue on their own. See infra app. II. The interviews were introduced by the State in
opposition to Rogers' motion for a new trial, in order to prove that the alleged improper
communication had no prejudicial effect. Rogers, 344 S.E.2d at 650. They were later used by
Rogers in his state post-conviction proceedings. See Memorandum in Support of Petition of
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not the entirety -of the jury's decision to sentence Rogers to death. 1
Ten of the twelve jurors explicitly stated that fear of his possible release
on parole was a factor in the sentencing decision. 2 Several indicated
that such fear was the primary factor.6 As juror Robbins so succinctly
stated, "we really felt like we didn't have any alternative." 64
Similar evidence was adduced following the 1989 Georgia trial of
Willie James Hall.6 ' As noted above, during the sentencing delibera-
tions, Hall's jury sent a note to the judge asking: "Is there life without
parole?' 66 The judge provided the edifying answer: "life means life and
death means death, ' 67 and sent the jury back for more deliberations.
Unsatisfied with the judge's answer, the jury later returned with a second
question: "Under Georgia law give us a definition of life in prison.
Under Georgia law is there a provision for parole to a person given a life
sentence?, 68 The judge responded that he could not answer this question
any better than he already had, 69 and the jury promptly returned with a
death verdict.70
Following the trial, a paralegal for Hall's attorney arranged inter-
views with ten of the twelve jurors.7 Two of them stated that they had
wanted to impose a life sentence, but had been deterred from doing so by
their belief" 'that there was no such thing as life imprisonment without
parole.' "72 Hall's case, like Rogers's, presents seemingly incontrovert-
ible evidence that parole is a factor very much on the minds of capital
juries, and that, regardless of any jury instruction, that factor is forming
the actual basis of their sentencing decisions. Stated differently, these
cases show quite clearly that juries are returning death verdicts as a re-
sult of the state's failure to provide, from the jury's perspective, a mean-
ingful sentencing alternative.
Writ of Habeas Corpus at 32-35, Rogers v. Kemp (Ga. Super. Ct. 1988) (Civ. No. 87-V-1007)
(copy on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
61. Relevant excerpts from the jury interviews are set out in Appendix II. In particular,
see the statements of jurors Davis, Sikes, Hazen, Gilmer, Hyde, Robbins and Drake. See infra
app. II.
62. See id. (statements of jurors Davis, Sikes, Hazen, Gilmer, Lemming, Hyde, Couch,
Robbins, Greer and Drake).
63. See id. (statements of jurors Sikes, Hazen, Robbins and Drake).
64. See id. at 392 (statement of juror Robbins).
65. See Hall v. State, 383 S.E.2d 128 (Ga. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 221 (1990).




70. Hall, 383 S.E.2d at 129 n.1.
71. Id. at 131.
72. Id. (quoting jury interviews).
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Thus, the cases of Jimmy Rogers and Willie Hall provide important
insight into the role that jury concern over the possibility of parole plays
in capital sentencing. Although the author's research has focused pri-
marily on Georgia, it is apparent that the Hall and Rogers cases are in no
way unique, and that the problem is not limited to that state. Indeed, it
is likely that cases just like Rogers's and Hall's regularly occur in every
state that does not give the capital sentencer a no-parole alternative.
For example, the 1987 trial of Michael Ray Quesinberry in North
Carolina is remarkably similar.73 After sentencing Quesinberry to death,
two jurors indicated in remarks to a newspaper reporter that the jury had
returned the death sentence in order to avoid the possibility of Quesin-
berry's release on parole.74 One juror stated: "'If a person deserves a
life sentence and gets it, he should serve life, instead of going and pulling
five or ten years and getting parole.' ,,7' Another juror stated: "'We felt
with the possibility of him being out in a short time, that wasn't fair.' 76
Defense counsel for Quesinberry subsequently submitted affidavits from
two additional jurors who stated that parole considerations were, in the
words of one, "'a primary factor in our deliberations.' ",7 Moreover,
one juror clearly stated that "'[t]en (10) years was the time period that
we used during our deliberations about how much time [the defendant]
would actually spend in prison if a life sentence was returned.' ,,78
73. State v. Quesinberry, 354 S.E.2d 446 (N.C. 1987). See Dayan et al., supra note 30, at
168-69 for a general discussion of the Quesinberry case.
74. Dayan et al., supra note 30, at 168. Significantly, as with Georgia, under the North
Carolina statute it would have taken the vote of only one of those jurors to have "acquitted"
Quesinberry of the death penalty. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(b) (1991).
75. Dayan et al., supra note 30, at 168 (quoting GREENSBORO NEWS & RECORD, Feb. 3,
1988, at A6).
76. Id. (quoting GREENSBORO NEWS & RECORD, Feb. 3, 1988, at A6).
77. Id. at 169 (quoting Motion for Appropriate Relief app. B at 2, State v. Quesinberry,
No. 83-CrS-05 & 06 (Superior Court for Randolph County filed Feb. 12, 1988), aff'd, 381
S.E.2d 681 (N.C. 1989), vacated, 494 U.S. 1022 (1990)). The fourth juror agreed, stating that
"'[t]he possibility of parole was a pretty hot issue during the deliberations.'" Id. at 169 (quot-
ing Motion for Appropriate Relief app. F at 1, State v. Quesinberry, No. 83-CrS-05 & 06
(Superior Court for Randolph County filed Feb. 12, 1988), aff'd, 381 S.E.2d 681 (N.C. 1989),
vacated, 494 U.S. 1022 (1990)).
78. Id (quoting Motion for Appropriate Relief app. B at 2 (emphasis added), State v.
Quesinberry, No. 83-CrS-05 & 06 (Superior Court for Randolph County filed Feb. 12, 1988),
aff'd, 381 S.E.2d 681 (N.C. 1989), vacated, 494 U.S. 1022 (1990)). In fact, a person convicted
of capital murder but sentenced to life imprisonment in North Carolina is not even eligible to
be considered for parole until he has served at least 20 years. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
1371(al) (1988 & Supp. 1991). Nonetheless, the North Carolina courts found nothing wrong
with Quesinberry's sentencing proceeding and affirmed his death sentence. State v. Quesin-
berry, 381 S.E.2d 681, 697 (N.C. 1989), vacated, 494 U.S. 1022 (1990). It should be noted that
Quesinberry's death sentence was ultimately vacated, together with many other inmates on
North Carolina's death row, following the United States Supreme Court's decision in McKoy
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Additional interviews, together with a number of surveys, con-
ducted in Mississippi,7 9 Georgia,"0 Maryland,81 Virginia 2 and Texas1
3
have yielded very similar results.84
C. Total Frustration: The Jury Creates Its
Own Sentencing Alternative
In the face of the State's failure to offer any meaningful alternative
sentence, at least one Georgia capital jury became so frustrated that it
attempted to create its own alternative, entirely outside the statutory
framework. 5 At Johnny Mack Westbrook's 1985 Georgia trial, the jury
v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 (1990), which held that a widely used jury instruction requir-
ing unanimity on mitigating factors was unconstitutional. Id. at 444; see Quesinberry v. North
Carolina, 494 U.S. 1022 (1990) (sentence vacated and remanded for holding consistent with
McKoy); State v. Quesinberry, 401 S.E.2d 632 (N.C. 1991) (sentence vacated due to McKoy
error because determined not to have been harmless beyond reasonable doubt).
79. See Paduano & Stafford Smith, supra note 30, at 223 n.35.
80. Id. at 221 n.30, 222 nn.31-32, 223 nn.34-35.
81. Marshall Dayan, Robert Steven Mahler and M. Gordon Widenhouse, Jr. reported
post-trial interviews with 30 jurors from six capital trials in Maryland in 1986. Sixty percent
of those interviewed acknowledged that parole was a factor in their sentencing decision.
Dayan et al., supra note 30, at 171. One-half thought that a person serving a life sentence
would be released in 10 to 15 years. Ia Fifty percent of those who entered deliberations
favoring a death verdict did so because they thought the defendant might otherwise be paroled.
Id.
82. See Hood, supra note 30, at 1606, 1620-26.
83. In Rose v. State, 752 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. Crim. App.), aff'g 724 S.W.2d 832 (rex. Ct.
App. 1987), the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals noted that "trial records and our own opin-
ions reflect that jurors cannot resist the temptation to discuss parole laws." Id. at 536. Citing
Rose and 15 other cases as examples, the dissent in the Fifth Circuit case of King v. Lynaugh,
850 F.2d 1055 (5th Cir. 198,8), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1019 (1989), stated:
Texas jurors have requested instructions on the operation of parole laws after having
been admonished not to consider that subject. In more than a dozen cases, the court
has confronted proof that jurors actually discussed parole during their deliberations
on sentencing despite admonitory instructions. In many of these cases, the appellant
also produced evidence that parole considerations had influenced the severity of the
punishment some jurors voted to impose.
Id. at 1064 (Rubin, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted); see also State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546,
585 (Utah 1987) (Durham, J., dissenting) ("Merely to instruct jurors that 'life imprisonment'
shall be imposed does not adequately inform them, since 'life' is an ambiguous term in our
statutory scheme.").
84. See, eg., Bruce v. State, 569 A.2d 1254 (Md. 1990); Petrocelli v. State, 692 P.2d 503
(Nev. 1985); State v. Johnson, 698 S.W.2d 631 (Tenn. 1985); Rose, 752 S.W.2d 529. For
general commentary on this problem in various states, see Paduano & Stafford Smith, supra
note 30, at 214-20, 223; Hood, supra note 30, at 1620-25; Gary Siller, Note, Munroe v. State:
Jury Discussions of Parole Law in Texas, 20 Hous. L. Rnv. 1491 (1983).
85. Westbrook v. State, 353 S.E.2d 504, 506 (Ga. 1987). Similarly, in some cases defend-
ants are actually "creating" their own life without parole alternative by making pretrial sen-
tencing agreements with the prosecution. See Paduano & Stafford Smith, supra note 30, at
225.
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first sent the judge two questions: "'Can we give the sentence of life
without chance of parole? If no, when will the defendant be eligible for
parole?' "86 The judge replied that he was "'not permitted to answer
either of these two questions.' ,,87 The jury, after deliberating further,
reported that it had reached a unanimous verdict and returned the fol-
lowing: "'We recommend mercy or that defendant's punishment be life
imprisonment with the stipulation that it be life without parole.' ,88 The
trial judge, however, refused to accept the jury's sentence of life without
parole, correctly observing that such a sentence simply does not exist in
Georgia. 9 The jury was instead sent back with the instruction to " 'con-
tinue your deliberations.' "90 At that point, frustrated in its attempt to
obtain information about parole, and frustrated in its attempt to render a
sentence that would ensure the defendant's permanent incarceration, the
jury imposed the death penalty.91
The Georgia Supreme Court reversed Westbrook's death sentence,
holding that because the jury had first "unanimously agreed to recom-
mend mercy"92 there had been an "acquittal" of the death penalty in the
initial verdict.93 Referring to the "without parole" stipulation returned
by the jury as "mere surplusage," 94 the court held that Westbrook's "pa-
role eligibility was not, and by law should not have been, an issue.""5
Yet, like the cases discussed above, the Westbrook case dramatically il-
lustrates that parole was not merely "an issue," but was the decisive issue
in the jury's decision to sentence Westbrook to death. 96 The jury was
clearly convinced that Westbrook should not be executed; yet it was also
clearly convinced that he should not be released into society. The Geor-
gia sentencing scheme, as far as the jury could determine-and they were
essentially correct-ensured the latter only by means of the former. It
86. Westbrook, 353 S.E.2d at 506 (quoting jurors in trial court proceeding).
87. Id. (quoting trial court judge).
88. IM (quoting trial court judge).
89. Id.
90. Id. (quoting trial court judge). The judge told the jurors:
"Ladies and gentleman of the jury, I cannot accept this verdict in the form that it is.
It is not one of the authorized forms of the verdict submitted to you to be rendered in
this case. So I will hand this back.., and ask you to go back into your jury room
and continue your deliberations."
Id. (quoting trial court judge).
91. Id ("Soon, the jury again reached a verdict, recommending life imprisonment on one
of the murder counts, and death on the other.").
92. Id. at 507.
93. Id





was only by luck-of-the-draw fortuity, resulting solely from the fact that
Westbrook's bolder-than-average jurors were willing to defy the court's
instructions, that his death sentence was ultimately reversed, and a life
sentence was imposed.97 In most cases, jurors frustrated with the appar-
ent inability or unwillingness of the state to otherwise incapacitate the
defendant simply impose a death sentence, and the question is never
raised again.98
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF A MEANINGFUL
ALTERNATIVE SENTENCE
So far, this Article has focused primarily on empirical material: jury
questions, post-trial jury statements and other indicators of dissatisfac-
tion with capital punishment schemes that only offer the alternatives of
death and life with the possibility of parole. What that material shows is
that, in a substantial number of cases, capital juries faced with such
schemes are returning death verdicts primarily because they fear that the
State will not otherwise ensure the incapacitation of the defendant. In
other words, capital sentencing juries in states like Georgia do not believe
that they are being given any real alternative to death, and are returning
death sentences for that reason, and not because they believe that death
is necessarily the most appropriate sentence.
The second half of this Article examines certain constitutional im-
plications raised by the material discussed in part I. These concerns arise
primarily from the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against "cruel and
unusual" punishment, and the requirement, based on the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments, that a sentencer must have an accurate under-
standing of the available sentencing alternatives. An examination of
these constitutional principles suggests that a meaningful alternative sen-
97. Id. at 507. Even in imposing a life sentence in Westbrook, the Georgia Supreme Court
(whose members are elected) felt compelled to point out that "the defendant is now 50 years
old, and... will not be eligible for consideration of parole until he has served 30 years of the
(two life] sentences imposed in this case." Id. at 507 n.3. This raises the question of what the
court might have done if Westbrook had been unlucky enough to have committed only one
murder, meaning he would have been eligible for parole after only 15 years.
98. The author is aware of no cases in which a jury imposed a life sentence instead of the
death penalty following a jury question regarding parole. It would be extraordinarily difficult
to determine whether, or to what extent, such cases exist, because life sentences imposed in
capital trials-the only trials in which juries sentence in most states-are most often not ap-
pealed, and hence no transcript is made. See generally Fred Codner, Univ. of Mich. Law
School Externship Program, Southern Prisoners' Defense Comm., The Only Game in Town:
Crapping Out in Capital Offense Cases Because of Juror Misconceptions About Parole 37 n.91
(1986) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review) (reporting
that no cases were found in which life is returned after parole question).
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tence must be made available in any capital sentencing proceeding, that
such an alternative must be structured so that the sentencers will be as-
sured of the defendant's long-term or permanent incarceration, and that
the current statute in Georgia, and in states with similar death penalty
statutes, does not meet these requirements.
A. Substance and Procedure Under the Eighth Amendment:
Alternative Sentences and Reliability in Capital Sentencing
As with many constitutional provisions, the scope and meaning of
the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against "cruel and unusual punish-
ments" has long been, and continues to be, the subject of intense de-
bate.9 9 As that debate has developed, courts have interpreted the Eighth
Amendment, perhaps not inconsistently, to impose several different types
of restrictions on a government's ability to punish those convicted of
criminal wrongdoing.l °° For example, the classic application of the
clause holds that a punishment is unconstitutional if it is so "barbaric" as
to be inconsistent with "basic concepts of human dignity."1 1 Beyond
99. See, eg., Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The
Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. Rnv. 839 (1969); Barton C. Legum, "Down the Road Toward
Human Decency": Eighth Amendment Proportionality Analysis and Solem v. Helm, 18 GA. L.
REv. 109 (1983); Pressly Millen, Interpretation of the Eighth Amendment: Rummel, Solem,
and the Venerable Case of Weems v. United States, 1984 DuKE L.J. 789 (1984); Dora Nevares-
Muniz, The Eighth Amendment Revisited: A Model of Weighted Punishments, 75 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 272 (1984); John C. Shawde, Jurisprudential Confusion in Eighth Amend-
ment Analysis, 38 U. MIAMI L. REv. 357 (1984). For recent discussions regarding the Eighth
Amendment in the capital punishment context, see John Blume & David Bruck, Sentencing
the Mentally Retarded to Death. An Eighth Amendment Analysis, 41 ARK. L. REv. 725
(1988); Fred P. Cavese, Clemons v. Mississippi-A Shortcut to the Executioner?, 22 PAc. L.J.
935 (1991); Peter K.M. Chan, Eighth Amendment: The Death Penalty and the Mentally Re-
tarded Criminal. Fairness, Culpability, and Death, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1211
(1990); Dominic J. Ricotta, Eighth Amendment: The Death Penalty for Juveniles-A State's
Right or a Child's Injustice, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 921 (1988); Richard A. Rosen,
Felony Murder and the Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence of Death, 31 B.C. L. RFv. 1103
(1990); Tanya M. Perfecky, Note, Children, the Death Penalty and the Eighth Amendment: An
Analysis of Stanford v. Kentucky, 35 VILL. L. REV. 641 (1990).
100. The Eighth Amendment's prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishments" has
been made applicable to the states by incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment. See
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962); see also Louisiana ex rel Francis v.
Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 462 (1947) (plurality opinion) (assuming without deciding that
Eighth Amendment is incorporated); Harmelin v. Michigan, III S. Ct. 2680, 2684 (1991)
(opinion of Scalia, J.) ("The Eighth Amendment ... applies against the States by virtue of the
Fourteenth Amendment.").
101. See, e.g., Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 237 (1940) (discussing quartering, rack
and thumbscrew); O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting) (referring
to "punishments which inflict torture, such as the rack, the thumbscrew, the iron boot, the
stretching of limbs, and the like"); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S 436, 446 (1890) (referring to
burning at stake, crucifixion and rack); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1878) ("it is safe
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that, even as to a punishment that is not per se unconstitutional, the
Supreme Court has held that the "arbitrary and capricious" application
of such punishment may violate the Eighth Amendment.' 2 In addition,
a punishment may be found unconstitutional, regardless of its inherent
barbarity or the arbitrariness of its application, if it is unacceptable to
contemporary society,10 3 or if it is simply "excessive."'" Thus, the pro-
hibition against cruel and unusual punishment imposes a variety of gen-
eral proscriptions regarding the nature of the punishment itself.105
Besides these "substantive" proscriptions, the Eighth Amendment
imposes certain requirements on the procedures by which punishment
may be imposed, particularly when that punishment is death. '06 Indeed,
that has been virtually the entire focus of the Court's capital punishment
to affirm that punishments of torture... and all others in the same line of unnecessary cruelty
are forbidden by" Eighth Amendment). It is this most basic prohibition against barbaric
forms of punishment that forms the most uniformly accepted purpose of the Eighth Amend-
ment. See Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2691-96 (opinion of Scalia, J.).
102. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 249 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
103. See, eg., Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666 ("[I]n the light of contemporary human knowl-
edge, a law which made a criminal offense of such a disease [(narcotics addiction)] would
doubtless be universally thought to be an infliction of cruel and unusual punishment .... ");
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101-04 (1958) (plurality opinion) (rejecting punishment of expatri-
ation); see also Mickle v. Henrichs, 262 F. 687, 690-91 (D. Nev. 1918) (rejecting punishment of
sterilization); State v. Drown, 326 S.E.2d 410, 412 (S.C. 1985) (per curiam) (rejecting punish-
ment of castration).
104. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) ("[T]he Eighth Amendment bars not only
those punishments that are 'barbaric' but also those that are 'excessive' .... "); Furman, 408
U.S. at 279 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("The final principle inherent in the [Eighth Amend-
ment] is that.., punishment must not be excessive."); O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339-
40 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting) ("The whole inhibition [of the Eighth Amendment] is against
that which is excessive.... ."). In Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910), the Supreme
Court adopted Justice Field's "excessiveness" theory of the Eighth Amendment, as expressed
in his dissent in O'Neil. Weems, 217 U.S. at 371-82; see also Granucci, supra note 99, at 100
(arguing that "cruel and unusual" clause was not originally limited to "inherently barbaric"
punishments, and that its original meaning was closer to doctrine of excessiveness).
105. There are, of course, several additional applications of the Eighth Amendment's prohi-
bition against cruel and unusual punishments. For example, the Amendment prohibits prison
officials from neglecting the medical needs of inmates, or from beating or otherwise physically
abusing inmates. See Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995, 999-1001 (1992) (cruel and unu-
sual punishment because inmate was beaten by guards while handcuffed and shackled, despite
lack of "serious injury"); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 326 (1986) (cruel and unusual
punishment because inmate was shot by officer during prison riot); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97, 103 (1976) (cruel and unusual punishment if prison officials inadequately treat injuries
sustained by inmates while engaged in prison labor). This Article does not address those as-
pects of the Eighth Amendment, but is concerned only with limitations on legislative determi-
nations as to permissible punishments and the procedures used to impose those punishments.
106. See infra notes 176-88; see also Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2607-08 (1991)
("Where the State imposes the death penalty for a particular crime, we have held that the
Eighth Amendment imposes special limitations upon that process.").
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decisions for the last two decades.1 "7 These "procedural" decisions make
it clear that there is a direct and inexorable link between the process by
which a punishment is determined and the possibility that its imposition
will constitute a cruel and unusual punishment. In other words, like
many constitutional provisions, the Eighth Amendment requires certain
judicial standards to ensure that its substantive prohibitions are not
violated.
1. The tainted results of "artificial choices"
In several different yet related respects, the Court's Eighth Amend-
ment procedural decisions suggest that a capital sentencing scheme that
offers the sentencer only two "artificial alternatives" cannot comport
with the Eighth Amendment. First, such a procedure infringes upon the
sentencer's discretion to decline to impose death when a lesser sentence is
more appropriate, as mandated by Roberts v. Louisiana,10 8 Woodson v.
North Carolina,1 9 and the entire corpus of modern capital jurisprudence.
By refusing to offer the sentencer any reasonable lesser alternative, the
state has limited the ability of the jury to exercise its statutory discretion,
and has thus created a " ' "risk that the death penalty will be imposed in
spite of factors which may call for a less severe penalty."' "110 Stated
differently, a punishment scheme that provides the sentencer with only
two unacceptable sentencing alternatives, death or life with the possibil-
ity of parole, cannot produce reliable sentencing decisions.11 As the
Court recehtly stated in another context, such a procedure "'creates the
possibility... of randomness,' by placing a 'thumb [on] death's side of
107. See generally Lewis v. Jeffers, 110 S. Ct. 3092, 3100 (1990) ("'A constant theme of our
cases... has been emphasis on procedural protections that are intended to ensure that the
death penalty will be imposed in a consistent, rational manner."' (quoting Barclay v. Florida,
463 U.S. 939, 960 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring))).
108. 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
109. 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion).
110. Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 76 n.4 (1987) (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455
U.S. 104, 119 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring)). As Professor Stephen Gillers has observed:
[I]f a jury chooses a death sentence because it is offered no other way to avoid the
possibility of parole or commutation, or because it deems the length of the alternative
prison term inadequate, its decision will be no less a response to the state's artificial
(if not contrived) categories.
Stephen Gillers, The Quality of Mercy: Constitutional Accuracy at the Selection Stage of Capi-
tal Sentencing, 18 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1037, 1109 (1985).
111. See, eg., Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305 (recognizing "need for reliability in the determina-
tion that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case"); see also Mills v. Maryland,
486 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1988) ("Evolving standards of societal decency have imposed a corre-
spondingly high requirement of reliability on the determination that death is the appropriate
penalty in a particular case.").
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the scale, thus 'creat[ing] the risk [of] treat[ing] the defendant as more
deserving of the death penalty.' 112
Several of the Supreme Court's capital cases have held or suggested
that such forced or artificial choices are unacceptable. The most obvious
example is Beck v. Alabama,113 in which the Court invalidated a capital
punishment statute that gave the jury only two choices: acquittal or con-
viction for capital murder.' 14 If the jury decided upon acquittal, the de-
fendant would obviously go free. Under the second choice, of course, the
defendant would be executed. Relying on the Eighth Amendment-
which concerns only punishment and not questions of guilt or inno-
cence-the Court held that this scheme was unconstitutional, because
"forcing the jury to choose between conviction on the capital offense and
acquittal creates a danger that it will resolve any doubts in favor of con-
viction." 1 5 As the Court explained in a later case:
The Court [in Beck] reasoned that the provision violated due
process because where the jury's only choices were to convict a
defendant of the capital offense and "sentence" him to death, or
to acquit him, but the evidence would have supported a lesser
included offense verdict, the factfinding process was tainted
with irrelevant considerations... [T]he unavailability of the
option of convicting on a lesser included offense may encourage
the jury to convict the defendant of a capital crime because it
believes that the defendant is guilty of some serious crime and
should be punished .... The unavailability of the lesser in-
cluded offense option, . . . thus "introduces a level of uncer-
tainty and unreliability into the factfinding process that cannot
be tolerated in a capital case."
' 1 6
While Beck may not be directly applicable, the Georgia capital pun-
ishment scheme nonetheless presents an analogous situation: A Georgia
capital sentencing jury is forced to choose between two alternatives,
neither of which may be acceptable." 7 Clearly, a jury that has just con-
112. Sochor v. Florida, 112 S. Ct. 2114, 2119 (1992) (citations omitted) (quoting Stringer v.
Black, 112 S. Ct. 1130, 1137, 1139 (1992)).
113. 447 U.S. 625 (1980).
114. Id. at 628-29.
115. Id at 632 (footnote omitted).
116. Baldwin v. Alabama, 472 U.S. 372, 386 (1985) (quoting Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S.
625, 642-45 (1980)); see also Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 455 (1984) (plurality opinion)
("The goal of the Beck rule... is to eliminate the distortion... that is created when the jury is
forced into an all-or-nothing choice.").
117. See California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1007 (1983) ("Restricting the jury in Beck to
the two sentencing alternatives ... in essence placed artificial alternatives before the jury...
limit[ing] the jury to two sentencing choices, neither of which may be appropriate."). Signifi-
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victed the defendant of aggravated murder must feel that he deserves
serious punishment; however, although they may not feel that he should
be executed, they also may not feel that he should be released in seven or
ten years. Because they do not want to see the latter, they decide upon
the former. The point cannot be overstated: Such forced sentencing de-
cisions are unreliable.
Moreover, in further violation of the Supreme Court's seminal capi-
tal punishment holdings, such a process does not provide for "meaning-
ful appellate review" of the basis of sentencing decisions.11 As the
Court recently stated in Parker v. Dugger,"9 "[w]e have emphasized re-
peatedly the crucial role of meaningful appellate review in ensuring that
the death penalty is not imposed arbitrarily or irrationally." 120 When the
sentencing scheme allows for, and even encourages, the imposition of
death on the basis of factors not encompassed within the capital punish-
ment statute, and as to which there are no instructions and no express
findings, meaningful appellate review of the basis of the jury's determina-
tion becomes a practical impossibility. As the material above demon-
strates, that is precisely what is happening with the issue of parole
eligibility in states where there is no life without parole alternative.
Thus, the failure to offer the jury a meaningful alternative renders appel-
late courts incapable of evaluating the basis of the sentencing decision,
and as a result, increases the risk of unreliability in capital sentencing.
2. The risk of "excessive punishment"
As noted above, apart from its procedural components, one of the
basic substantive aspects of the Eighth Amendment, both within and
without the capital punishment context, is its prohibition against exces-
cantly, Ramos held that a jury instruction that the governor can commute a sentence of life
without parole to a sentence of life with the possibility of parole did not violate the Constitu-
tion. Id at 1001-03. However, two facts bear noting in this regard. First, the jury instruction
at issue in Ramos was subsequently held unconstitutional under the California Constitution.
People v. Ramos, 37 Cal. 3d 136, 142, 689 P.2d 430, 432, 207 Cal. Rptr. 800, 802 (1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1119 (1985). Second, it remains in California that a capital sentencing jury is
nonetheless given a meaningful alternative to the death penalty-life without parole. CAL.
PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 1988). Presumably, regardless of any clemency instruction, the
jury may count on the political process to impose constraints upon the governor's commuta-
tion powers. See generally Hugo A. Bedau, The Decline of Executive Clemency in Capital
Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 255 (1991) (discussing and explaining declining
use of executive clemency in capital cases).
118. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 335-36 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 280, 293-94 (1976) (plurality opinion); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976)
(plurality opinion).
119. 111 S. Ct. 731 (1991).
120. Id at 739.
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sive punishments. The question arises as to whether the type of sentenc-
ing scheme utilized by Georgia and similar states implicates this
substantive proscription by providing insufficient lesser sentencing
alternatives.
The Supreme Court has indicated that a punishment might be deter-
mined to be excessive under either of two different approaches. Under
the first and most commonly utilized approach, a punishment is mea-
sured against the crime for which it is imposed, and is unconstitutional if
it is "grossly disproportionate" to that crime.121 Applying this aspect of
the excessiveness doctrine, courts have invalidated a variety of sentences,
including capital punishment in certain contexts, 122 as well as other, less
severe punishments,1 23 on the ground that they were disproportionate to
121. See, eg., Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 308-09 (1990) C" '[A] societal consen-
sus that the death penalty is disproportionate to a particular offense prevents a State from
imposing the death penalty for that offense."' (quoting McCieskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,
305-06 (1987))); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 288 (1983) ("Mhe Eighth Amendment pros-
cribes grossly disproportionate punishments."); see also Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 271
(1980) (Eighth Amendment prohibits imposition of sentence grossly disproportionate to sever-
ity of crime); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (Eighth Amendment bars not only
punishments that are "barbaric" but also those that are "excessive" in relation to crime com-
mitted); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 371 (1910) ("greatly disproportionate"
sentences prohibited). Courts applying a proportionality analysis typically consider three fac-
tors: "(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty, (ii) the sentences imposed
on other criminals in the same jurisdiction, and (iii) the sentences imposed for the commission
of the same crime in other jurisdictions." Solem, 463 U.S. at 293. This "tripartite analysis"
has, however, been the subject of recent debate on the Supreme Court. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 128-41.
122. Although the Supreme Court held in Gregg, 428 U.S. 153, that the death penalty is not
necessarily disproportionate as a form of punishment for some crimes, id at 187, the Court has
subsequently held that death is disproportionate for other crimes. See Enmund v. Florida, 458
U.S. 782, 801 (1982) (death penalty is disproportionate punishment in absence of intent to
kill); Coker, 433 U.S. at 597 (death penalty is disproportionate for crime of rape); see also Lisa
G. Bradley, Proportionality in Capital and Non-Capital Sentencing: An Eighth Amendment
Enigma, 23 IDAHo L. REv. 195, 195-96 (1986-87) ("[T]he doctrine of proportionality requires
that punishments be graduated according to the severity of the offense, and must not be 'exces-
sive' "). But see Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 157-58 (1987) (recklessness may constitute
sufficient level of intent to allow imposition of death penalty).
123. See Solem, 463 U.S. at 303 (life without parole disproportionate for mere crime of
repeated utterance of bad checks); Weems, 217 U.S. at 380-82 (fifteen years at hard and painful
labor, constant enchainment, deprivation of parental authority, loss of right to dispose of prop-
erty inter vivos and continual surveillance for life is disproportionate punishment for falsifying
government record); see also Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136, 138 (4th Cir. 1973) (life imprison-
ment disproportionate for violation of West Virginia recidivist statute), cert denied, 415 U.S.
938 (1974); United States v. McKinney, 427 F.2d 449, 455 (6th Cir. 1970) (five years' impris-
onment disproportionate for refusal to submit to induction into armed forces), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 982 (1971); Dembowski v. State, 240 N.E.2d 815, 818 (Ind. 1968) (maximum sen-
tence of 25 years' imprisonment for crime of robbery is disproportionate because maximum
sentence for greater crime of armed robbery is only 20 years); State ex rel Garvey v. Whitaker,
19 So. 457, 459 (La. 1896) (six years' imprisonment is disproportionate punishment for picking
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the crime for which they were imposed.124 Under a second approach, a
punishment may be excessive if it does not make a measurable contribu-
tion to an acceptable penalogical goal. 2 Justice Brennan believed this
to be the more fundamental aspect of the excessiveness doctrine, stating
at one point that, "[a]lthough the determination that a severe punish-
ment is excessive may be grounded in a judgment that it is disproportion-
ate to the crime, the more significant basis is that the punishment serves
no penal purpose more effectively than a less severe punishment."
12 6
This approach is more complex, more difficult to apply and often not
relevant, because most punishments may serve a wide range of purposes,
and it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether a lesser punish-
ment would better serve several of those purposes. As discussed more
fully below, however, this second approach to excessiveness can be
flowers in public park); Cannon v. Gladden, 281 P.2d 233, 235 (Or. 1955) (life imprisonment
disproportionate for assault with intent to commit rape when maximum punishment for
greater crimes of forcible and statutoryrape is only 20 years' imprisonment); State v. Kim-
brough, 46 S.E.2d 273, 277 (S.C. 1948) (30 years' imprisonment disproportionate to crime of
burglary if facts demonitrate burglary was not aggravated).
124. To avoid confusion, it should be noted that in the death penalty context, the concept of
"proportionality" sometimes also has a different meaning. Specifically, certain states have stat-
utes requiring that, as part of the appellate review process in capital cases, the appellate courts
must compare the facts of the case to those of other cases in which a death sentence was
returned. See, eg., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 198 (finding Georgia's death penalty statute constitu-
tional in part because of comparative "proportionality analysis" which it requires state
supreme court to conduct). However, this type of "proportionality review" is not required as a
matter of federal constitutional law. See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 45 (1984).
125. In Coker, Justice White wrote for the Court that "a punishment is 'excessive' and
unconstitutional if it (1) makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment
... or (2) is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime." 433 U.S. at 592; see also
Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2329 (1991) (White, J., concurring) (" 'Today the Eighth
Amendment prohibits punishments which, although not physically barbarous, "involve the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain".... Among "unnecessary and wanton" inflictions
of pain are those that are "totally without penalogical justification."' " (quoting Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981))); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 335 (1989) ("We have
also considered whether the application of the death penalty to particular categories of crimes
or classes of offenders violates the Eighth Amendment because it 'makes no measurable contri-
bution to acceptable goals of punishment and hence is nothing more than purposeless and
needless imposition of pain and suffering."' (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592
(1977))); McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 301 (1987) ("[A]ny punishment might be unconsti-
tutionally severe if inflicted without penalogical justification."); Rummel, 445 U.S. at 293 &
n.10 (observing that "the inquiry into 'excessiveness' has two aspects," and that "[a] sentence
may be excessive if it serves no acceptable social purpose, or is grossly disproportionate to the
seriousness of the crime"); Hart, 483 F.2d at 143; United States v. Fiore, 467 F.2d 86, 89 n.8
(2d Cir. 1972), cert denied, 410 U.S. 984 (1973). As Justice Brennan noted, this conception of
excessiveness can be traced in this country's jurisprudence to Supreme Court decisions of the
late 19th century. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 279-80 (1972) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
126. Furman, 408 U.S. at 280 (Brennan, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
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viewed as both relevant and applicable to the problems discussed in this
Article.127
It should first be noted that the debate over the Eighth Amendment,
and particularly its prohibition against excessive punishment, recently
reached the Supreme Court in Harmelin v. Michigan.128 Harmelin had
been convicted of possessing 672 grams of cocaine, and was sentenced to
a mandatory term of life without parole.129 He challenged his sentence
under the Eighth Amendment, relying primarily on the Supreme Court's
holding in Solem v. Helm. 1 0 The reliance on Solem seemed logical: Us-
ing the traditional tripartite analysis,' 1 Solem had invalidated an identi-
cal sentence of life without parole imposed under a recidivist statute for
minor financial crimes, on the grounds that it was disproportionate to the
crime committed in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 32
Despite Solem, however, the Court was deeply divided over Harme-
lin's claim, with no more than three Justices joining any of the five opin-
ions written in the case. Justice Scalia, joined only by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, argued that Solem was wrongly decided and should be over-
ruled, together with any other noncapital cases that imposed a propor-
tionality requirement under the Eighth Amendment.133 Justice
Kennedy, joined by Justices O'Connor and Souter, concurred in a very
short section of Justice Scalia's opinion,' thereby securing a majority to
127. See infra text accompanying notes 128-69.
128. 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991). The Court's decision inHarmelin has already generated some
critical commentary. See, e.g., Bruce Campbell, Proportionality and the Eighth Amendment:
Harmelin v. Michigan, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 284, 286 (1992) (criticizing Justice
Scalia's failure in Harmelin to provide mechanism to address extreme cases of disproportion-
ate punishment); Craig W. Palm, RICO Forfeiture and the Eighth Amendment: When Is
Everything Too Much, 53 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1, 42-59 (1991) (discussing extensive history of
proportionality analysis and Harmelin's impact).
129. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2684 n.1.
130. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
131. Id. at 290-92; see also supra note 121.
132. Solem, 463 U.S. at 304.
133. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2684-702. Scalia's analysis focused largely on the history of
the Eighth Amendment and concluded that the prohibition against cruel and unusual punish-
ments, which indisputably derives from the English Declaration of Rights of 1689, was not
originally intended to impose a proportionality requirement, but merely to prohibit the use of
particular modes of especially cruel punishment. Id. at 2686-91 (opinion of Scalia, J.). In
Scalia's view, the imposition of any mode of punishment that the Framers did not intend to
prohibit, such as the length of a prison term, should be left to the discretion of state legisla-
tures. Id. at 2696-99 (opinion of Scalia, J.).
134. Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter concurred only in the final part of Scalia's
opinion, upholding the sentence on grounds that the mandatory imposition of life without
parole does not violate the Constitution because the requirement of individualized sentencing,
which allows the defendant to present evidence of mitigating factors, does not apply outside of
the capital context. Id. at 2702 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment).
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affirm Harmelin's sentence. However, these Justices expressly rejected
the remainder of the opinion, refused to overrule precedent and voted to
reaffirm what they viewed as "the narrow proportionality principle that
has existed in our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence for 80 years." 135
Justice White, joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens, dissented and
advocated a stronger reaffirmance of Solem and the tripartite analysis
upon which it had been based.136 Finally, in two additional opinions,
Justices Marshall and Stevens, although stating their agreement with Jus-
tice White, noted additional reasons for their refusal to join the opinions
of either Justice Scalia or Justice Kennedy.
137
Harmelin is significant in several respects. First, it was the most
extensive exposition on the Eighth Amendment that the Supreme Court
had undertaken in nearly a decade, and it revealed the views of the sev-
eral Justices appointed during that time. Second, it reaffirmed the basic
proportionality principles of the Eighth Amendment against a strong
challenge, which garnered the support of only two Justices. Finally, and
most importantly here, each Justice, 138 even the two who supported over-
ruling past proportionality cases, made it quite clear that they would
continue to apply proportionality analysis, and implicitly the excessive-
ness doctrine on which it is based, in the capital punishment context.139
135. Id. at 2702 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment). Justice Ken-
nedy saw no reason to disturb Solem, instead distinguishing it on the ground that the crime in
Solem had been a minor, non-violent financial crime, whereas Harmelin's drug crime could
readily be linked to violence. Id. at 2706 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, concurring in
judgment) ("Petitioner's suggestion that his crime was non-violent and victimess... is false to
the point of absurdity."). Kennedy also disagreed with both Justice Scalia and the dissenting
Justices on the proper interpretation of Solem, finding that it did not require a tripartite analy-
sis, but only a comparison between the crime and the sentence, followed, in an appropriate
case, by further intra- and inter-jurisdictional comparisons. Id. at 2706-07 (Kennedy, J., con-
curring in part, concurring in judgment).
136. Id. at 2712-19 (White, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 2719 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 2719-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
138. It is worth noting that Justice Thomas, who joined the Court after Harmelin was
decided, expressed a narrow view of the Eighth Amendment in Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S.
Ct. 995, 1004-11 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting). In Hudson, the Court held that inmates may
assert claims, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988), for violation of their Eighth Amendment rights
where they were beaten by prison guards, regardless of whether they suffered serious injuries.
Id. at 997. Only Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, dissented from the holding, arguing
that the Eighth Amendment "is not, and should not be turned into, a National Code of Prison
Regulation." Id at 1010 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Although his opinion in Hudson does not
indicate his views on the excessiveness or proportionality requirements of the Eighth Amend-
ment, Justice Thomas nonetheless indicated in Hudson that he would take a narrow and con-
servative view of the Amendment. Id. at 1005 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
139. See Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2701 (opinion of Scalia, J.) ("Proportionality review is one
of several respects in which we have held that 'death is different,' and have imposed restric-
tions that the Constitution nowhere else provides."); id. at 2702 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
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Harmelin thus provides a strong reafflimation of the Eighth Amend-
ment's prohibition against excessive punishment, and indicates that the
Court will continue to enforce that prohibition, particularly in cases in
which the death penalty is concerned.
Concentrating as it did on the proportionality doctrine, however,
Harmelin did not directly address the other approach to the prohibition
against excessive punishment, that is, the requirement that a punishment
measurably contribute to a valid penalogical goal.14° Under that ap-
proach, the rule has been stated as follows: "A punishment is excessive
under this principle if it is unnecessary.... If there is a significantly less
severe punishment adequate to achieve the purposes for which the pun-
ishment is inflicted, . . . the punishment inflicted is unnecessary and
therefore excessive."
' 141
Under this conception of the excessiveness doctrine, as Justice Ste-
vens stated in Spaziano v. Florida,42 "[i]n order to evaluate a claim that
a punishment is excessive, one must first identify the reasons for impos-
ing it."' 143 Initially, this warrants reference to the basic principle that
criminal punishment may serve any of four penalogical goals: retribu-
tion, deterrence, rehabilitation or incapacitation (sometimes referred to
as "specific deterrence")." 4 It seems obvious, however, that in the case
of the death penalty the acceptable penalogical goals must be narrowed.
In the first place, rehabilitation "is obviously inapplicable to the death
part, concurring in judgment) ("Its most extensive application has been in death penalty
cases."); id. at 2711-12 (White, J., dissenting) (discussing proportionality analysis as it applies
to capital cases); id. at 2719 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Eighth Amendment requires
comparative proportionality review of capital sentences.").
140. Justice White's opinion in Harmelin did, however, repeat the language from Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), that the Eighth Amendment's excessiveness doctrine prohibits
"a punishment that '(1) makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment
and hence is nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering;
or (2) is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime."' Harnelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2711
(White, J., dissenting) (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977)).
141. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 279 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (citations
omitted).
142. 468 U.S. 447 (1984) (plurality opinion).
143. Id. at 477 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
144. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScoTr, CRIMINAL LAW 23-27 (2d ed. 1986);
see also Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2704 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, concurring in judg-
ment) ("The federal and state criminal systems have accorded different weights at different
times to the penalogical goals of retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation."
(citations omitted)); Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 478 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part) ("[P]unishment may rationally be imposed for four reasons: (1) to rehabilitate the of-
fender; (2) to incapacitate him from committing offenses in the future; (3) to deter others from
committing offenses; or (4) to assuage the victim's or the community's desire for revenge or
retribution.").
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:327
sentence."' 4 A dead man may not be rehabilitated. Beyond this, as Jus-
tice Stevens has stated, incapacitation "would be served by execution, but
in view of the availability of imprisonment as an alternative... the death
sentence would clearly be an excessive response to this concern. "146
Thus, "incapacitation alone could not justify the imposition of capital
punishment."' 47 As the Court has observed, 4 ' this leaves retribution
and deterrence as the only valid justifications for executing a criminal.' 49
The Court implicitly applied these principles in Ford v. Wain-
wright,'50 holding that execution of the insane is prohibited by the Eighth
Amendment, among other reasons because it would not serve either of
the goals of retribution or deterrence.' 5 ' Turning to the common-law
principles that prohibited such executions prior to the adoption of the
145. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 478 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
146. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
147. Id. at 478 n.19 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
148. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (plurality opinion) ("The death pen-
alty is said to serve two principle social purposes: retribution and deterrence of capital crimes
by prospective offenders."); see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 343 (1989) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("[P]unishment [of death] must further the penal goals
of deterrence or retribution."); Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 478 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dis-
senting in part) (after eliminating rehabilitation and incapacitation, "[w]e are thus left with
deterrence and retribution as the justifications for capital punishment"); Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238, 307 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("society's interest in deterrence and retribu-
tion" are central questions in reviewing constitutionality of capital punishment); cf id. at 311-
12 (White, J., concurring) ("Nor could it be said with confidence that society's need for specific
deterrence justifies death for so few when for so many in like circumstances life imprisonment
or shorter prison terms are judged sufficient .. ").
149. Although the Supreme Court has repeatedly suggested that retribution and deterrence
are the only valid bases for the death penalty, see supra notes 145-48 and accompanying text,
the Court also has upheld a capital sentencing scheme that requires the jury to answer a ques-
tion regarding the defendant's "future dangerousness." See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 272-
73, 276 (1976). Arguably, such a scheme incorporates incapacitation as a factor in the sen-
tencing process. Two points should be noted in this regard. First, the unique Texas statute at
issue in Jurek allows the presentation of evidence on the question of "future dangerousness,"
and the issue before the Court in Jurek was whether the statute also allows sufficient mitigat-
ing evidence, not whether the jury is confronted with artificial and unacceptable sentencing
choices. Id. at 272. Indeed, the jury does not actually impose sentence under the Texas
scheme. Id. at 274. Second, if, as this Article suggests, the Georgia scheme infringes upon the
Eighth Amendment by failing to offer a meaningful alternative sentence, then the Texas
scheme may be subject to a similar attack. At any rate, Jurek is not inconsistent with the
argument advanced here, which is not that a sentencing jury cannot consider the defendant's
possible future actions in deciding what sentence to impose (assuming evidence is properly
presented on that question), but that given the presence of such concerns, a sentencing scheme
that provides only "artificial alternatives" for dealing with them, and therefore forces a death
verdict as the only way to ensure incapacitation, results in the imposition of a punishment
divorced from its purposes.
150. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
151. The decision in Ford did notexpressly refer to the excessiveness doctrine as such-it
simply applied the analysis. Ford also rested upon a determination that executing the insane
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Constitution, the Court found that "the reasons put forth for the com-
mon-law restriction have no. less logical, moral, and practical force than
they did when first voiced."1"2 The Court reasoned that it remained true
that execution of an insane defendant "provides no example to others
and thus contributes nothing to whatever deterrence value is intended to
be served by capital punishment. 153 Moreover, "today, no less than
before, we may seriously question the retributive value of executing a
person who has no comprehension of why he has been singled out and
stripped of his fundamental right to life."' 54 Noting that "execution
serves no purpose in these cases," 1 5 the Court held that "[t]he Eighth
Amendment prohibits the State from inflicting the penalty of death upon
a prisoner who is insane."
156
The following year, in Sumner v. Shuman,15 7 the Court reempha-
sized these principles with even greater force. Shuman had been sen-
tenced under a Nevada statute that mandated the death penalty for
murder committed by an inmate already serving a sentence of life with-
out parole.15 8 Returning to its earlier decisions in Roberts v. Louisi-
would be barbaric, id at 410, and would violate contemporary standards of decency. Id at
408-10, 408 n.2.
152. Id. at 409.
153. Id. at 407. The Court quoted Sir Edward Coke, who had observed as early as 1680
that "'by intendment of Law the execution of the offender is for example,... but so it is not
when a mad man is executed, but should be a miserable spectacle, both against Law, and of
extreme inhumanity and cruelty, and can be no-example to others."' Id. (quoting 3 EDWARD
COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 6 (London, W. Rawlins, 6th ed. 1680)).
154. Id. at 409; see also id at 408 ("More recent commentators opine that the community's
quest for 'retribution'-the need to offset a criminal act by a punishment of equivalent 'moral
quality'-is not served by execution of an insane person, which has a 'lesser value' than that of
the crime for which he is to be punished.").
155. Id. at 407.
156. Id. at 410. Several years ago, John Blume and David Bruck argued that similar princi-
ples should preclude the execution of the mentally retarded. See Blume & Bruck, supra note
99. Noting that a punishment is deemed excessive if it "makes no measurable contribution to
any acceptable goal of criminal punishment," id at 738, and that "the Supreme Court has
repeatedly stated [that] the legitimate penalogical interests arguably furthered by capital pun-
ishment are deterrence and retribution," id. at 742, Blume and Bruck made a forceful argu-
ment that execution of the retarded could not rationally serve either of those interests. Their
argument was, however, at least partly foreclosed the following year by Penry v. Lynaugh, 492
U.S. 302 (1989), in which the Court found that persons with Penry's intelligence (mildly re-
tarded) are sufficiently capable of understanding their actions to allow constitutional imposi-
tion of the death penalty. Notably, the jury that sentenced John Paul Penry to death did not
face a sentencing alternative of life without parole. Id. at 310.
157. 483 U.S. 66 (1987).
158. The Nevada statute in question was repealed following the Supreme Court's decisions
in 1976. Id at 70. Shuman, however, had been sentenced prior to its repeal, and the Court's
1976 decisions had expressly reserved judgment on whether such a statute could be justified
under the Eighth Amendment. Id at 77.
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ana 159 and Woodson v. North Carolina,1" the Court first held that such a
sentencing scheme could not withstand constitutional scrutiny because it
did not allow the defendant to present evidence in mitigation.1 61 In the
second part of its holding, however, the Court concentrated on the ques-
tion of whether the death penalty could be justified in such circumstances
on the grounds of either deterrence or retribution.162 After careful analy-
sis, the Court determined that, as to each of the two possible bases for
imposition of the death penalty, there was a lesser form of punishment
that could suffice, and that therefore a mandatory sentence of death was
not "necessary":
A mandatory capital-sentencing procedure for life-term in-
mates is not necessary as a deterrent. An inmate who is serving
a life sentence is not immune from Nevada's death penalty if he
is convicted of murder....
We also reject the proposition that a mandatory death pen-
alty for life-term inmates convicted of murder is justified be-
cause of the State's retribution interests .... Moreover, there
are other sanctions less severe than execution that can be im-
posed even on a life-term inmate. An inmate's terms of con-
finement can be limited further, such as through a transfer to a
more restrictive custody or correctional facility or deprivation
of privileges or work or socialization.1 63
In conclusion, the Court stated that "any legitimate state interests can be
satisfied fully through the use of a guided discretion statute," 164 and that
the Nevada scheme was therefore unconstitutional under the Eighth
Amendment.
1 65
159. 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
160. 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion).
161. Sumner, 483 U.S. at 78-82.
162. Id at 82-85.
163. Id at 82-84. Apparently, the Court in Sumner was very interested in the question of
whether there was a less severe punishment that could serve the state's interests in retribution
and deterrence. In a lengthy footnote, the Court indicated that during oral argument, it had
requested public records regarding the ultimate disposition of offenders sentenced to life with-
out parole in Nevada. Id at 83 n. 11. Those records indicated that such offenders are some-
times actually released on parole. From this, the Court concluded that "the most obvious
[lesser] sanction is to withdraw the parole possibility," id., and that therefore "it is somewhat
misleading, or at least confusing, to argue that the death penalty is the only real sanction that
could be imposed on Shuman to punish him for his action while incarcerated." Id.




Ford v. Wainwright 166 and Sumner v. Shuman 167 suggest a straight-
forward application of the excessiveness doctrine in the capital punish-
ment context: that is, the decisions suggest that the death penalty may
not be imposed where it clearly does not serve either of the penalogical
goals of retribution or deterrence. 168 Presumably, no one argued that
Ford or Shuman should have their sentences affirmed in order to serve
the purpose of incapacitation, and the Court's, reasoning in each case
strongly suggests that such an argument could not prevail.169 Yet this
Article shows that death is, in numerous cases, being imposed for pre-
cisely that reason, not because the State directly so argued, but because,
indirectly, the State did not offer the sentencer any realistic alternative.
Like the sentencing schemes at issue in Ford and Shuman, those which
fail to provide an alternative of life without parole result in a schizo-
phrenic rift between the punishment and the purpose for which it is im-
posed, a schism which is, or should be, unconstitutional under the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against excessive punishment.
B. Informed Sentencing: Making the Alternative Meaningful
The basic thrust of this Article is that a capital punishment scheme
infringes upon the Eighth Amendment if it fails to offer a life without
parole alternative sentence. Beyond this initial point, however, it must
be added that such an alternative sentence would nonetheless remain
meaningless unless the sentencer were possessed of a full and accurate
understanding as to its meaning and availability. While this may seem
obvious, it requires at least some elaboration because Georgia,17 ° and the
166. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
167. 483 U.S. 66 (1987).
168. Ford and Sumner suggest that the excessiveness doctrine can implicate both the sub-
stantive and procedural aspects of the Eighth Amendment. In Ford, execution of a category of
persons was proscribed on the basis that such executions would not serve a legitimate penalogi-
cal purpose, and would therefore be unnecessary or excessive. In Sumner, a particular proce-
dure for the imposition of death was held unconstitutional, despite the fact that the petitioner
belonged to a category of persons who could constitutionally be executed, because that proce-
dure could nonetheless result in the imposition of unnecessary or excessive punishment. Both
cases, however, make clear that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the needless or excessive
imposition of the death penalty.
169. Indeed, such an argument by the State would require a mandatory mistrial under
Georgia law. See Quick v. State, 353 S.E.2d 497, 503 (Ga. 1987).
170. As noted above, the Georgia Supreme Court held in 1948 that information regarding
the defendant's potential eligibility for parole could not be considered by the jury in a capital
case. Thompson v. State, 47 S.E.2d 54, 57 (Ga. 1948). The Georgia legislature followed in
1955 with a statute prohibiting counsel for either side in a criminal case from presenting argu-
ments to the jury based upon the possibility of "pardon, parole or clemency." GA. CODE
ANN. § 17-8-76(a) (Harrison 1990). As Anthony Paduano and Clive A. Stafford Smith ob-
served several years ago, both Thompson and the 1955 statute were intended to benefit capital
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vast majority of capital punishment states, currently prohibits a jury
from considering any aspect of parole or clemency in its deliberations. 171
Where juries are involved in the sentencing process, 172 such rules would,
unless modified, be an absolute bar to the effectiveness of any require-
ment that a no-parole alternative be provided in capital sentencing
proceedings. 173
The starting point of any analysis of this problem must be the prin-
ciple articulated in Gregg v. Georgia 174 that "accurate sentencing infor-
mation is an indispensable prerequisite to a reasoned determination of
whether a defendant shall live or die by a jury of people who may never
have made a sentencing decision."' 75 Without such information, the
jury's decision will be based on speculation at best, and more likely on
actual misinformation, and the outcome will necessarily be arbitrary and
capricious, implicating the problems which led to Furman in the first
place. In a capital case, accurate sentencing information is a fundamen-
tal component of the Eighth Amendment's procedural requirements.
In addition, and wholly apart from the Eighth Amendment, funda-
mental principles of due process require that a sentencer in a criminal
case fully understand all of the available sentencing options. Hicks v.
defendants, who had frequently been prejudiced by prosecutorial arguments that the jury
should impose a more severe sentence, such as death, in order to prevent the defendant's re-
lease on parole. See Paduano & Stafford Smith, supra note 30. However, in the modem, post-
Furman era, the rule has been used to the opposite effect: to prevent capital defendants, whose
actual parole eligibility would be more restricted than the average juror would presume, from
introducing accurate information regarding their ineligibility for parole if sentenced to life
imprisonment. See, eg., Quick, 353 S.E.2d 497; Pope v. State, 345 S.E.2d 831 (Ga. 1986), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 872 (1987); Cargill v.. State, 340 S.E.2d 882 (Ga. 1986); Davis v. State, 340
S.E.2d 869 (Ga.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 871 (1986); Horton v. State, 295 S.E.2d 281 (Ga.
1982), cer. denied, 459 U.S. 1188 (1983); see also Hood, supra note 30, at 1617-20 (similar
analysis of Virginia's prohibition against providing jury with parole instructions).
171. See infra note 200.
172. See Paduano & Stafford Smith, supra note 30, at 214 n.7, 215 nn.8-10 (discussing and
listing states in which juries participate in capital sentencing).
173. Other commentators have advanced various arguments in favor of providing capital
juries with more thorough information regarding existing life sentence alternatives. See, e.g.,
id. at 238-44 (arguing that Supreme Court's decision in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978),
requires admission of evidence regarding defendant's ineligibility for parole if sentenced to life
imprisonment); Hood, supra note 30, at 1631-35 (arguing that requirement of reliability in
capital sentencing mandates accurate information on parole eligibility). This Article does not
attempt a full exploration of that subject, or of the various states' positions on it. It does,
however, argue that, where juries are involved in the capital sentencing process, full instruction
as to the availability and meaning of a life without parole alternative is necessary if, as sug-
gested herein, such an alternative is itself constitutionally required.
174. 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion).
175. Id. at 190.
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Oklahoma 176 provides a leading illustration of this principle. In Hicks,
the Supreme Court held that a sentence cannot withstand constitutional
scrutiny if it is based on a misunderstanding of the available sentencing
alternatives. 177 In that case, the jury had been instructed on the basis of
a recidivist statute that was subsequently declared unconstitutional.
178
The instruction given to the jury mandated a forty-year prison sentence
for the crime, even though a proper instruction would have provided for
a sentence as low as ten years. 1 7 9 The Court vacated Hicks' sentence and
held that the charge had improperly limited the exercise of the jury's
discretion by restricting its sentencing alternatives. 180 This holding was
required despite the fact that the jury "might have imposed" the same
sentence if properly informed of its valid sentencing options.181 Thus,
Hicks stands for the proposition that if a sentencing authority (whether
judge or jury) lacks full "knowledge and understanding" of the available
sentencing options, it cannot properly exercise its sentencing discretion,
and its decision will therefore be unconstitutionally arbitrary, even if
within the range of available sentencing alternatives. 18 2
Elaborating on this due process requirement, the Fifth Circuit, in
Dupuy v. Butler,183 set forth a clear and simple standard for evaluating a
Hicks claim: "[T]o establish a valid Hicks claim, the state criminal de-
fendant must show.., that the sentencing authority lacked knowledge
and understanding of the range of sentencing discretion under state law
and . . . that there was a 'substantial possibility' that prejudice was
thereby caused." '184 Prejudice is established "by [a] showing that the sen-
tencing authority was ... ignorant of one or more less severe options,"
and that "a substantial possibility exists that the sentencer, if properly
176. 447 U.S. 343 (1980).
177. Id. at 346.
178. Id. at 345.
179. Id. at 344-45, 344 n.1.
180. As the Court later described its holding in Hicks: "We held that under state law Hicks
had a liberty interest in having the jury impose punishment, an interest that could not be
overcome by the 'frail conjecture' that the jury 'might' have imposed the same sentence in the
absence of the recidivist statute." Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 747 (1990).
181. Hicks, 447 U.S. at 346. The Seventh Circuit has stated the Hicks rule as follows:
Hicks surely establishes the proposition that where state law prescribes a range of
possible punishment, to be fixed by the jury, it is a deprivation of liberty without due
process for the state court to require the jury to impose a longer imprisonment than
the least the jury was authorized to choose.
Kelsie v. Trigg, 657 F.2d 155, 157 (7th Cir. 1981).
182. See, e.g., Anderson v. Jones, 743 F.2d 306, 308 (5th Cir. 1984); cf Walton v. Arizona,
110 S. Ct. 3047, 3057 (1990) ("When a jury is the final sentencer, it is essential that the jurors
be properly instructed regarding all facets of the sentencing process.").
183. 837 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1988).
184. Id. at 703 (footnotes omitted).
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informed, would have chosen one of these less severe sentencing op-
tions."1" 5 This standard should be applied in the capital context.1
8 6
At any rate, whether the rule is derived from the Eighth Amend-
ment or the Due Process Clause, it is clear that the Constitution, at least
in a capital case, requires that the sentencer understand the task with
which it is charged. Where the sentencer is a jury, such understanding
can only be assured by adequate instruction by the trial court. Inasmuch
as the Constitution might require the provision of a meaningful alterna-
tive sentence in a capital case, it therefore follows that the Constitution
will also require that the jury be fully instructed as to the availability and
precise meaning of the alternative.' In the words of the Eleventh Cir-
cuit, "discretion is not fully accorded the sentencer unless it is exercisable
in an informed manner."' 88
185. Id.
186. Significantly, this standard would clearly be met in the cases of Rogers v. State, 344
S.E.2d 644 (Ga. 1986), Hall v. State, 383 S.E.2d 128 (Ga. 1989) and State v. Quesinberry, 354
S.E.2d 446 (N.C. 1987), discussed above. See supra notes 55-78 and accompanying text.
187. The Supreme Court of Mississippi reached essentially this conclusion in Berry v. State,
575 So. 2d I (Miss. 1990). Relying on the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion, and on an equivalent state constitutional provision, the court held that, "[a]ccurately
informing the jury that the alternative to the death penalty is life, without benefit of probation
or parole, can only enhance the sentencing process, insuring that excessive punishment shall
not be inflicted." Id. at 14 (recidivist statute eliminated parole possibility); see also State v.
Henderson, 789 P.2d 603, 606-07 (N.M. 1990) (according to "due process and [the] eighth
amendment," capital sentencing jury should have been informed that defendant would not
have been eligible for parole for over 30 years, since given that information jury would have
been "more likely to impose a life sentence instead of the death sentence"); infra note 202
(discussing similar conclusion reached by Maryland Supreme Court where capital sentencing
statute allowed elimination of parole possibility).
188. Goodwin v. Balkcom, 684 F.2d 794, 801 (1lth Cir. 1982) (discussing Gregg v. Geor-
gia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976) (plurality opinion)), cert denied, 460 U.S. 1098 (1983); see also
Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 429 (1980) (plurality opinion) (commenting that death sen-
tence may not rest on "sheer speculation" of basically uninstructed jury). The conclusion that
the Eighth Amendment requires the sentencer to be given full information regarding the sen-
tencing decision is also implicit in the Court's holding in Lankford v. Idaho, 111 S. Ct. 1723
(1991). In Lankford, the defendant had been sentenced to death by a trial judge even though
there had been no prior indication that the death penalty might be imposed. The prosecution
had specifically stated that it did not intend to seek the death penalty, and the matter of a
possible death sentence had never been mentioned by the trial court or the State at any time
prior to the court's actual sentencing. In holding that this procedure violated the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments, the Court reasoned that a sentencing decision must be based upon
full notice and a proper "adversary process." Id. at 1732-33. "If notice is not given, and the
adversary process is not permitted to function properly, there is an increased chance of error,
... and with that, the possibility of an incorrect result." Id. at 1733 (citations omitted).
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C. The "Evolving Standards of Decency"
Apart from the various, and sometimes obtuse, excursions upon
which an exegesis of the Eighth Amendment might take us, the entire
focus of any evaluation under that constitutional provision is that its pro-
hibition against cruel and unusual punishments is, in its most fundamen-
tal sense, subject to "the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society." '89 As the Court stated in Ford v. Wain-
wright,19° "[n]ot bound by the sparing humanitarian concessions of our
forebears... this Court takes into account objective evidence of contem-
porary values before determining whether a particular punishment com-
ports with the fundamental human dignity that the Eighth Amendment
protects."191 In a way that is perhaps unique in American constitutional
law, therefore, the meaning of this constitutional provision changes with
public sentiment.
192
The type of "objective evidence" that the Court has considered im-
portant in measuring societal standards has included a variety of factors,
but has often focused heavily-particularly in capital cases-upon the
reactions of juries to existing legislative schemes. 193 As Justice Stewart
189. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion); see also Hudson v. McMil-
lian, 112 S. Ct. 995, 1000 (1992) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality
opinion)); Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822, 2836 (1990) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
101 (1958) (plurality opinion)); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 (1989) (quoting Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815,
821 (1988) (plurality opinion) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opin-
ion)); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101
(1958) (plurality opinion)); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406 (1986) (quoting Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346
(1981) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)); Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion));
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
101 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
190. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
191. Id at 406 (citations omitted); see also Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378
(1910) (Eighth Amendment "is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public
opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice").
192. This has often been explained by the language of the prohibition itself, which refers to
"cruel and unusual punishments." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. Apart from the fact that the
definition of "cruel" is subject to change over time, in order to determine that a particular
punishment is "unusual" it is obviously necessary to refer to current practices. Those practices
will be different at different times in our history, and may also differ geographically at any
given time. Indeed, the tripartite proportionality analysis discussed in Part I above is based
substantially on these assumptions, and is designed to determine precisely what is an "unu-
sual" punishment.
193. See, eg., Penry, 492 U.S. at 330-31; Thompson, 487 U.S. at 822-25, 822 n.7; Baldwin v.
Alabama, 472 U.S. 372, 380 (1985); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 794-96 (1982); Wood-
son v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 288 (1976) (plurality opinion); Gregg v. Georgia, 428
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stated in Gregg v. Georgia,194 "[j]ury sentencing has been considered de-
sirable in capital cases in order 'to maintain a link between contemporary
values and the penal system-a link without which the determination of
punishment could hardly reflect "the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society." ' "15 What this Article shows
is that juries have repeatedly and consistently had negative reactions
to-indeed, have outright rejected- capital sentencing schemes that do
not offer a life without parole alternative. This alone should be enough
to suggest that such schemes violate the Eighth Amendment.
In addition to jury reactions, the legislative decisions of various ju-
risdictions also provide an important indicator of where the "evolving
standards of decency" currently reside.196 In this respect, it is important
to note that a significant number of death penalty states have already
decided to provide sentences that eliminate the possibility of parole for
those convicted of capital murder but sentenced to life imprisonment. 197
Specifically, of the thirty-six states that currently have capital punish-
ment schemes, 198 at least eleven provide that a life sentence for capital
U.S. 153, 175-76 (1976) (plurality opinion); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 388 (1972)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting); McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 201-02 (1971); Witherspoon,
391 U.S. at 519 & n.15. As Justice White has stated: "Legislative 'policy' is... necessarily
defined not by what is legislatively authorized but by what juries and judges do in exercising
the discretion so regularly conferred upon them." Furman, 408 U.S. at 314 (White, J.,
concurring).
194. 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion).
195. Id. at 190 (citations omitted) (quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15
(1968)); see also Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (in determining excessiveness of
punishment "attention must be given to the public attitudes concerning a particular sentence-
history and precedent, legislative attitudes, and the response of juries reflected in their sentenc-
ing decisions are to be consulted").
196. See Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822, 2836 (1990) ("[Tlhis Court has often looked to
the laws of the States as a barometer of contemporary values."); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492
U.S. 361, 369 & n.1 (1989) (courts must consider American society as a whole to determine
what standards have evolved); Penry, 492 U.S. at 334-35 ("Legislation ... is an objective
indicator of contemporary values."); Thompson, 487 U.S. at 821-22 ("In [determining the
evolving standards of decency], the Court has reviewed the work product of state legislatures
and sentencing juries."); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 300 (1987) ("First among these
indicia are the decisions of state legislatures .... We have also been guided by the sentencing
decisions of juries... ."); Woodson, 428 U.S. at 294-95 ("Legislative measures adopted by the
people's chosen representatives weigh heavily in ascertaining contemporary standards of de-
cency."); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179 ("The most marked indication of society's endorsement of the
death penalty for murder is the legislative response ....").
197. For an analysis of various sentencing schemes which provide limited- or no-parole
alternatives, their relative costs and benefits, and the advisability of legislative enactment of
such statutes, see Wright, supra note 30.
198. See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-40 (Supp. 1992); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (1989);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-101 (Michie Supp. 1991); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.1 (West 1988);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-11-103 (West Supp. 1991); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a
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murder is served without the possibility of parole.199 At least four other
states allow the sentencer in a capital sentencing proceeding the discre-
tion to return a sentence of either life without parole or life with the
possibility of parole after a specified period.2"° Thus, at least fifteen capi-
(West 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209 (1987 & Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 921.141 ('West 1985 & Supp. 1992); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30 (Harrison 1990); IDAHO
CODE § 19-2515 (1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); IND.
CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9 (Burns Supp. 1992); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 532.025 (Michie/Bobbs-
Merrill 1990); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905 (West 1984); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 413 (1992); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101 (Supp. 1992); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.020
(Vernon Supp. 1992); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-18-301 to -310 (1991); NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 29-2522 to -2523 (1989); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 200.030 to -.035 (Michie 1992); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5 (Supp. 1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1 1-3 (West Supp. 1992); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-1 (Michie 1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000 (1988); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2929.02 (Anderson 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.10 (West Supp.
1992); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150 (1989 & Supp. 1992); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 9711 (1982
& Supp. 1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 23A-27A-1 (Supp. 1989); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204 (1991); TEx. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 19.03 (West 1989 & Supp. 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-206 to -207 (Supp. 1992);
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31 (Michie Supp. 1992); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 10.95.020 to
.030 (West 1990); Wyo. STAT. §§ 6-2-101 to -102 (Supp. 1992). Note that Vermont, which is
usually included in this list, repealed its death penalty statute in 1991. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
§ 2303(a)-(b) (1981), repealed by An Act Relating to Aggravated Murder and the Penalties for
First and Second Degree Murder, no. 60, § 2, 1987 Vt. Laws 124, 125.
199. The following states provide that life sentences served for capital murder are without
possibility of parole: Alabama, ALA. CODE § 13A-5-45 (1982); Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 5-10-101(c) (Michie 1987); California, CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a) (West Supp. 1992);
Colorado, COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-105(4) (West Supp. 1991); Connecticut, CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a(f) (West 1985); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(a)
(1987); Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30(C) (West 1986 & Supp. 1992); Missouri, Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 565.020 (Vernon Supp. 1992); New Hampshire, N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 630:5(V) (Supp. 1991); South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 24-15-4 (1988); and
Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.030 (West 1990).
In addition, Illinois provides life without parole for murder committed by one with a prior
homicide conviction and for multiple homicides. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-8-
l(a)(1)(c), 1003-3-3(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992).
Finally, it should be noted that 10 states now provide that life imprisonment for capital
murder means at least 20, 25, 30 or even 35 years without the possibility of parole. See ARIz.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(A) (1989) (25 to 35 years, depending on age of victim); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 775.082(1) (West 1992) (25 years); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-9-39 (Harrison 1990) (25
years); MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-516(c)(2) (Supp. 1992) (25 years); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:1 1-3(b) (West Supp. 1992) (30 years); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-21-10(A) (Michie 1990) (30
years); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1371(al) (Supp. 1991) (20 years); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 2929.03(A), -.03(C)(2) (Anderson 1987) (20 or 30 years); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(A)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991) (30 years with aggravating circumstance; 20 years without); VA.
CODE ANN. § 53.1-151(C) (Michie 1991) (25 years for murder of child under eight years of
age; 15 years otherwise). The possibility that these alternatives might prove adequate should
not be entirely ruled out.
200. The following states allow the sentencer to decide whether to impose a sentence of
death, life without parole, or life with the possibility of parole (after varying amounts of time):
Maryland, MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 412(b) (1992); Nevada, NEv. REV. STAT. ANN.
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tal punishment states already provide what could be an adequate and
meaningful alternative to death, if the sentencer were properly in-
structed,20 1 and several of those states may actually meet the standard
proposed by this Article, by providing not only an adequate alternative
but also an adequate jury charge. 2
Finally, as a further objective measure of contemporary standards,
opinion polls indicate that the majority of the public would prefer a lim-
ited or no-parole alternative to the death penalty. 0 3 For example,
§ 200.030(4)(b) (Michie 1986); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.9(A) (West 1992);
Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. § 163.105(1)(c) (1989). In addition, several states are now offering
the sentencer alternatives that include death, life without parole for a substantial but definite
number of years, or a standard sentence of "life." See, e.g., KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §
532.030(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990) (death, life without parole for 25 years, or life).
Moreover, Julian Wright has noted in his analysis of the various types of life sentences cur-
rently available, certain states, such as Washington and Montana, indirectly provide a life
without parole alternative in capital cases by certain statutory provisions by which the sen-
tencer can limit or eliminate parole in certain circumstances. See Wright, supra note 30, at
541-42. Finally, numerous states provide that life sentences must be served without the possi-
bility of parole if the defendant is classified as a recidivist. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-
19-81 (Supp. 1992).
201. But see supra text accompanying notes 170-88 (even sentencing option of life without
parole does not become "meaningful" to sentencing proceeding until jury is properly in-
structed as to its availability).
202. This Article does not attempt a full analysis of the various approaches currently used
by states with limited-parole alternatives, but instead discusses why such alternatives might be
constitutionally mandated. As noted above, however, several states do offer the sentencer the
option of sentencing the defendant to death, life without parole, or life with the possibility of
parole. See supra note 200. Maryland provides a good example of how such a system might
meet the standard suggested by this Article. After the Maryland legislature decided in 1987 to
provide a life without parole alternative in capital cases, the Maryland Supreme Court, in a
series of decisions, held that information regarding that alternative must be given to the sen-
tencing jury by means of clear and accurate instruction. See Bruce v. State, 569 A.2d 1254
(Md. 1990); Doering v. State, 545 A.2d 1281 (Md. 1981). As the court stated in Bruce:
In weighing the appropriateness of a death sentence, the jury is entitled to know
about the available sentencing alternatives .... Without an appropriate instruction,
the jurors may not have understood that, as an alternative to the death penalty, they
could impose a life sentence which would imprison the Appellant for the balance of
his natural life .... This information can be relevant and assist the jury in determin-
ing whether death is the appropriate penalty.
Bruce, 569 A.2d at 1268-69. It therefore appears that Maryland, in stark contrast to Georgia,
may currently offer an adequate alternative sentence, and may also provide sufficient jury in-
struction to render that alternative fully meaningful to the sentencing process. Although to
the author's knowledge there has been no full study of the impact of this new scheme, it has
already been reported that the number of death sentences imposed in Maryland has declined
since it was established. See Stephanie Griffith & Stephen Buckley, Two Different Death Pen-
alty Decisions: Agonizing in the Jury Room, WASH. PosT, Aug. 4, 1991, at BI.
203. To the extent it may be relevant, it should be noted that numerous studies have con-
firmed that it is less costly to support an inmate in prison for his entire life than to execute that
same inmate. See, e.g., David J. Gottlieb, The Death Penalty in the Legislature: Some
Thoughts About Money, Myth, and Morality, 37 KAN. L. Rtv. 443 (1989); Barry Nakell, The
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Anthony Paduano and Clive A. Stafford Smith reported several Georgia
polls in their 1987 article, 2" including, for example, a 1985 study finding
that sixty-seven percent of the potential jurors polled would be more
likely to return a life sentence if given assurances that the defendant
would have to serve at least twenty-five years before becoming eligible for
parole.2"5 Polls subsequently conducted outside of Georgia have pro-
duced similar results. A Florida study, for example, showed that forty-
four percent of those polled would be less likely to favor execution of a
defendant if they knew that the defendant would serve at least twenty-
five years without parole if sentenced to life imprisonment.20 6 Similarly,
a Nebraska study showed that the majority of Nebraskans would favor a
life sentence with no parole for twenty-five years, together with a pro-
gram of restitution, instead of the death penalty.20 7 Surveys conducted
in New York, where the death penalty is not imposed, similarly show
that, although the majority (seventy-one percent) of New Yorkers would
favor the death penalty, fifty-four percent would prefer an alternative of
life without possibility of parole.208
Cost of the Death Penalty, 14 CRIM. L. BULL. 69 (1978); Robert L. Spangenburg & Elizabeth
R. Walsh, Capital Punishment or Life Imprisonment? Some Cost Considerations, 23 LoY. L.A.
L. REV. 45 (1989); Ronald J. Tabak & J. Mark Lane, The Execution of Injustice, 23 LoY. L.A.
L. REv. 59 (1989); Margot Carey, Comment, The Cost of Taking a Life: Dollars and Sense of
the Death Penalty, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1221 (1985).
204. Paduano & Stafford Smith, supra note 30.
205. Id. at 223 n.34, 223-25 n.35 (discussing additional polls showing that majority of pub-
lic would be more likely to favor life sentence if informed that defendant would have to spend
at least 20 or 25 years in prison before being eligible for parole). One Georgia poll, conducted
by Georgia State University's Center for Public and Urban Research in 1986, found that 53%
of Georgia adults would favor abolition of capital punishment if state law provided for life
sentences with no parole for at least 25 years and for a program for victim restitution. See id.
at 228 n.40.
206. See Fox et al., supra note 53, at 513-14. Fox, Michael L. Radelet and Julie L. Bonsteel
reported a number of studies showing that public sentiment in favor of the death penalty
declined dramatically when nontraditional alternatives were offered. Id. at 513-14, 514 n.63.
They concluded that "many citizens, if they felt secure that the most heinous killers would be
incarcerated for life (as opposed to sentenced to life), would likely abandon their insistence on
the death penalty as the 'only' sure way of keeping the streets safe from certain convicted
killers." Id at 513.
207. See ALAN BooTH, UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA-LINCOLN, MAJORITY FAVOR ALTER-
NATIVES TO DEATH PENALTY 2, 4 (1988). Specifically, although 68% of those polled said
they favored the death penalty, 58% of the total group said they would prefer life without
parole for 25 years, combined with victim restitution. Id. at 2-4.
208. William J. Bowers & Margaret Vandiver, New Yorkers Want an Alternative to the
Death Penalty: Executive Summary of a New York Survey Conducted March 1-4, 1991, at 2-
4 (1991) (unpublished manuscript, on fie with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
III. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, there are substantial objective indicators that,
although contemporary American society does not reject the death pen-
alty outright, the majority nevertheless believes that there should be, in
every capital case, an alternative sentence that would effectively incapaci-
tate the defendant short of death. Such an alternative would differ from
the traditional "life" sentence, in that it would expressly eliminate the
possibility of the defendant's ultimate release on parole. Views favoring
such an alternative have found expression in public opinion polls, which
indicate a significant drop in support for the death penalty when a no-
parole or limited-parole alternative is offered, and in legislative enact-
ments, by which an increasing number of states have eliminated or lim-
ited parole eligibility for capital defendants sentenced to life
imprisonment. Perhaps most importantly, such a view has manifested
itself in the reactions of juries to existing sentencing schemes which pro-
vide only the alternatives of death or a traditional "life" sentence with
possibility of parole. As this Article shows, juries have had strongly neg-
ative reactions to such a scheme, and have frequently sentenced defend-
ants to death because they felt that, given only these options, they faced
no meaningful alternative.
This situation has serious constitutional implications. First, a death
sentence returned under such a sentencing scheme cannot be relied upon
to reflect a properly guided and reasoned decision that death is the most
appropriate punishment. Second, where a jury is primarily concerned
with the defendant's incapacitation from committing further crimes, but
is forced to return a death verdict because of the State's failure to offer
any other means of doing so, such a sentence constitutes excessive pun-
ishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, for the simple reason
that incapacitation is not a constitutionally sufficient basis upon which to
execute a criminal defendant. Finally, where there is such clear evidence
that contemporary values require the availability of a life without parole
alternative in any capital case, the failure to provide such an alternative,
and to inform the sentencer of its availability, infringes upon the "evolv-
ing standards of decency" protected by the Eighth Amendment.
In contrast to the harm caused by failure to offer a life without pa-
role alternative, the remedy is simple, straightforward and virtually
costless. As demonstrated by states that have already done so, it would
be a simple matter to provide, in every case where the death penalty is
sought, an alternative sentence which would ensure that the defendant
will be incarcerated for life, either completely or substantially without
the possibility of parole. Moreover, in order to make that alternative
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sentence fully meaningful to the sentencing process, the sentencer must
be made to understand its availability and its exact meaning. Where jury
sentencing is used, therefore, the jury should be fully and accurately in-
structed as to the exact meaning of all its sentencing options, and should
be reassured (accurately) that, if sentenced to life imprisonment, the de-
fendant will never be released into society again. Such provisions would
in no way limit the ability of the State to seek the death penalty when
such a sentence is deemed appropriate, and would not affect the ability of
the sentencer to impose it when, upon reasoned reflection, such a result is
thought proper. As the Supreme Court stated in invalidating the
mandatory scheme at issue in Sumner v. Shuman 209 in favor of a guided
discretion statute, "[t]hose who deserve to die according to the judgment
of the sentencing authority will be condemned to death under such a
statute.,210 On the other hand, once an appropriate alternative is made
available, it will become less likely that those who, in the judgment of the
sentencing authority, do not deserve to die, will nonetheless be con-
demned to death.
209. 483 U.S. 66 (1987).
210. Id. at 83. As one commentator has noted in discussing Kentucky's three-tiered capital
sentencing scheme, which provides a limited parole alternative, "[tihe result is a catalog of
sentencing alternatives that is advantageously flexible, politically sound, and pleasing to sev-
eral constituency groups." Wright, supra note 30, at 552.
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APPENDIX I: CASES WITH JURY QUESTIONS REGARDING PAROLE
Of the 280 Georgia cases from 1973 through 1990 in which a death
sentence was imposed by the jury, the following seventy involved a jury
question that related to the nature of the life sentence alternative. The
cases are presented in alphabetical order by name of the defendant and
include the jury's question and the court's response. Where reference is
to a retrial, the defendant's name is followed by "(2d)," "(3d)," etc.
Cases are further identified by the Georgia Supreme Court docket
number and the citation to that Court's decision on direct appeal (unless
the case is too new to have such citations).
1. Alderman, J. (2d), Docket No. 41588 on Direct Appeal, 327 S.E.2d
168 (Ga. 1985).
The record shows that an alternate juror asked the following
question:
QUESTION: "If I may, if, you know, I had to go in to delib-
erate and I wanted to-say my decision was to give him life
imprisonment, would this be the type life that he would be able
to get out after a certain amount of years?"
COURT: "I'm not allowed by law to answer that question. I
believe that was submitted to me earlier."
State v. Alderman (Trial Ct. Tr. at .1452).
2. Allen, S. (2d), Docket No. 40912 on Direct Appeal, 321 S.E.2d 710
(Ga. 1984).
QUESTION: "The difference between life imprisonment and
death, and the aggravating and the mitigating. Would you tell
us the difference? Is that possible?"
COURT: "I can recharge any part of the charge that you
don't understand and that the jury wants to hear, and the only
thing I can do is recharge."
The court then reread the jury charge. State v. Allen (Trial Ct. Tr. at
435-38).
3. Allen, W., Docket No. 45987 on Direct Appeal, 377 S.E.2d 150 (Ga.
1989).
QUESTION BY NOTE: "Is a person eligible for parole at




COURT: "Ladies and gentlemen, I tell you at this time un-
equivocally that the jury cannot consider such matter at all. It
is my instruction to you that such matter as has been inquired
about is not proper for the jury's consideration in any shape,
form, or fashion. I hope that answers your question."
State v. Allen (Trial Ct. Tr. at 210).
4. Banks, J. (1st), Docket No. 30099 on Direct Appeal, 218 S.E.2d 851
(Ga. 1975).
QUESTION: "Is it possible for you to explain to the Jury
that if a life sentence is invoked, what are the terms-or how is
this sentence served?"
COURT: "The only thing that the Court can say to you, Mr.
Foreman, Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury, is that the Court
would impose a sentence for life. That is as far as the law will
permit the Court to comment."
State v. Banks (Trial Ct. Tr. at 294).
5. Beck, E. (1st), Docket No. 41765 on Direct Appeal, 326 S.E.2d 465
(Ga. 1985).
QUESTION: "[W]ould you please explain what the life sen-
tence means?"
COURT: "Life sentence is a life sentence. That's all I can tell
you.''
State v. Beck (Trial Ct. Tr. at 568); see also Beck v. State, 340 S.E.2d 9,
11-12 (Ga. 1975) (affirming trial court's sentence of death penalty for
felony murder conviction).
6. Berryhill, M.G. (1st), Docket No. 30173 on Direct Appeal, 221
S.E.2d 185 (Ga. 1975).
The appellate opinion in this case states that the jury sent a note to
the court asking if they could sentence the defendant to life without pa-
role; the judge sent back a note saying he could not answer this question.
This happened without defendant or his counsel present, and therefore is
not in the trial court transcript. This issue was raised as an error by
defendant but found not to be error by the Georgia Supreme Court. See
Berryhill v. State, 221 S.E.2d 185, 189 (Ga. 1975).
7. Berryhill, M.G. (2d), Docket No. 38206 on Direct Appeal, 291
S.E.2d 685 (Ga. 1982).
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QUESTION: "And the jury had another question as to the
life sentence. We have been in deliberation and much discus-
sion about what it entails. Would it be possible for the Court to
give us some kind of information as to what the life sentence
consists of?"
COURT:' "I camnbt aiiswer any such question."
State v. Berryhill (Trial Ct. Tr. at 1493-94).
8. Birt, B.S., Docket No. 30638 on Direct Appeal, 225 S.E.2d 248 (Ga.
1976).
QUESTION: "Could we receive information on parole on a
life sentence?"
COURT: "Mr. Foreman, you will give no consideration to
that. The Court nor this jury has any jurisdiction over the rules
of the Pardon & Parole Board. They are subject to change.
Thank you."
State v. Birt (Trial Ct. Tr. at 933).
9. Black, R.L., Docket No. $91P-0984 on Direct Appeal, 410 S.E.2d
740 (Ga. 1991).
QUESTION: "In this particular case, death would be over a
period of time-life would be over a period-well, I guess what
we're trying to say, the difference in this particular case-if I
may ask, what would be the difference in the two terms, really,
as far as being in prison? I know life means that a life-"
COURT: "For your purposes, you must assume that the
death penalty means what it says, that a life sentence means
imprisonment for the rest of his natural life. For your pur-
poses, that's what you must consider. Okay?"
State v. Black (Trial Ct. Tr. at 976-77).
10. Bowen (2d), Docket No. 34877 on Direct Appeal, 260 S.E.2d 855
(Ga. 1979).
QUESTION: "Judge, there is a discussion, I'm not sure if
we're in order. I'm not sure if you have an answer but we ran
into this already about a life sentence possibly ending in a pe-
riod as short as seven years."
COURT: "You are not to concern yourselves with any pun-
ishment other than the two that I have given you .... I cannot




State v. Bowen (Trial Ct. Tr. at 612).
11. Brown, J W., Docket No. S90P-1325 on Direct Appeal, 401 S.E.2d
492 (Ga. 1991).
QUESTION BY NOTE: "1) If the sentence were life, would
he be eligible for parole? If so when? 2) Is there a sentence 'life
without parole[?]'"
COURT: "In response to the note you gave the Bailiff, ladies
and gentlemen, I charge you that you have been presented with
the only two sentences available under our law.
You shall not consider the question of parole. Your delib-
erations must be limited to whether this defendant shall be sen-
tenced to death or whether he shall be sentenced to life in
prison.
You should assume that your sentence, whichever it may
be, will be carried out."
State v. Brown (Trial Ct. Tr. at 770-71, 803).
12. Brown, N., Docket No. 36813 on Direct Appeal, 275 S.E.2d 52 (Ga.
1981).
QUESTION: "But what we are really asking in essence is if
we would suggest and in our opinion give a life term, would this
mean that it would be more or less a twenty year sentence and
at that time the man or whoever-not necessarily in this case-
but in general-would then be eligible to ask for parole after
serving a period of time?"
COURT: "Under no circumstances can you be concerned
with anything except the fixing of the sentences to be served by
the defendant. You cannot go, under any circumstances, be-
yond that point, and the Court is unauthorized under our law,
to charge you concerning those things which you mentioned."
State v. Brown (Trial Ct. Tr. at 499-500).
13. Brown, P., Docket No. 30362 on Direct Appeal, 220 S.E.2d 922
(Ga. 1975).
QUESTION: "The gentlemen of the jury would like Your
Honor to explain to them, should they decide to give this de-
fendant or fix his punishment at two consecutive life sentences,
is he eligible for parole on Count One and Count Two, and, if
APPENDIX I
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
so, what are the limitations on the amount of time that he
should serve in each case[?]"
COURT: "I know the answer and I wish I could give it to
you forthright, . . . [B]ut my hands are sort of tied under the
rules of the appellate courts and the law as to answering your
question."
JURY FOREMAN: "There's one other question .... The
gentlemen of the jury would like to know if they had the au-
thority to specify not less than a certain number of years."
COURT: "No. You have to set it definitely."
JURY FOREMAN: "Your Honor, we understand that. We
understand this, the alternatives we could find. The only thing
that we were concerned about was if we had the authority to set
by not less than--"
COURT: "I understand."
JURY FOREMAN: "[A] certain number of years. Of
course, this could be a technicality as far as the Pardon and
Parole Board is concerned if the jury had the authority to set
not less than, and not be subject to early review."
COURT: "See, there's no way I can. You have to set a definite
set number. The law will not allow me to discuss the Pardon
and Parole Board, since you mentioned it, because we have no
control over that at all. We have to operate the court and then
that's up to them; that's something else."
State v. Brown (Trial Ct. Tr. at 298-301).
14. Burden, Docket No. 38766 on Direct Appeal, 297 S.E.2d 242 (Ga.
1982).
QUESTION: "If we fix sentence as life imprisonment on each
one of the counts, does that mean that the four sentences of life
imprisonment will be served consecutively?"
COURT: "That is a matter that you would not be concerned
with. Your determination is to fix the sentence and then any
other consideration that may be given to that would not be
within your jurisdiction."
State v. Burden (Trial Ct. Tr. at 1027-28).
15. Burger, CA. (1st), Docket No. 33807 on Direct Appeal, 247 S.E.2d
834 (Ga. 1978).
QUESTION: "If a man is sentenced to life imprisonment, af-
ter what length of time is he eligible for parole?"
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COURT: "Mr. Foreman, and ladies and gentlemen under the
law of the State of Georgia, I am required to tell you that is to
receive no consideration whatsoever by you at this point. That
is a constitutional power vested in the constitutionally com-
posed board, and that is for their determination, and not for
yours nor mine."
State v. Burger (Trial Ct. Tr. at 439).
16. Butler, R.D., Docket No. 41735 on Direct Appeal, 332 S.E.2d 654
(Ga. 1985).
QUESTION: "If a life sentence is imposed, what is the maxi-
mum period the prisoner could serve regardless of the length of
sentence and he's an accomplice, which says multiple life
sentences, for example, before he would be eligible for parole."
QUESTION: "Does a sentence of life without possibility of
parole exist in Georgia?"
COURT: "Any and all issues concerning parole, pardons, or
anything of that nature is something that you should not con-
sider in your deliberations."
State v. Butler (Trial Ct. Tr. at 1421-22).
17. Charles, Indictment No. 23392-95 (charges dropped on motion for
new trial).
QUESTION: "Your Honor, the jury would like to know if a
life sentence is granted, how long would this sentence be before
he could be paroled[?]"
COURT: "Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury, that is not a
matter for you, the jury, to consider or for judges to consider."
State v. Charles (Trial Ct. Tr. at 245-46); see also Tabak & Lane, supra
note 203, at 100 (stating that Charles was released three years after his
conviction "when new evidence proved his alibi to be true").
18. Childs, JB., Docket No. 43955 on Direct Appeal, 357 S.E.2d 48
(Ga. 1987).
QUESTION BY NOTE: "'On consecutive life sentences,
what are minimum number of years before they are eligible for
parole?'"
COURT: "My answer to the jury on that is, I am not permit-
ted by law to discuss that matter.., at all. That's the only
answer I know on that one."
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QUESTION BY NOTE: "'Is it possible for jury to recom-
mend life without parole?'"
COURT: "[T]he answer would be no."
State v. Childs (Trial Ct. Tr. at 1705-06).
19. Cohen, M.A., Docket No. 44457 on Direct Appeal, 361 S.E.2d 373
(Ga. 1987).
QUESTION BY NOTE: "Judge Taylor, would you please
define life imprisonment in terms of years in prison ......
COURT: "The only thing that I can tell you with respect to
your question as posed, is that you are bound by the charge
that I have given you, and that is the law of this State that I
have given you. I can't give you anything else."
State v. Cohen (Trial Ct. Tr. Vol. 8 at 88).
20. Coley, Docket No. 28131 on Direct Appeal, 204 S.E.2d 612 (Ga.
1974).
QUESTION: "We want to know if we put, like in each one of
these sentences in here, would he have to serve the number of
years for all four in consecutive, one behind the other, or would
he be on probation for some of these?"
COURT: "[A]s regards your question, that would be some-
thing that there's no way in the world I could tell you the an-
swer to because a part of it would address itself to the State
Pardon and Parole Board and what they ever do or might do
this Court has no knowledge of."
State v. Coley (Trial Ct. Tr. at 255-56).
21. Collier, R.L., Docket No. 35063 on Direct Appeal, 261 S.E.2d 364
(Ga. 1979).
QUESTION: "When would an individual be eligible for pa-
role with a life sentence?"
COURT: "[T]his is a question that I cannot answer in any
way, shape, form or fashion, nor can I comment on it in any
way."
State v. Collier (Trial Ct. Tr. at 1439-40).




QUESTION: "If the accused is given life sentence, what is
the law regarding the minimum time before consideration of
parole?"
COURT: "I do not know and that is not a matter for this
jury's consideration."
State v. Conklin (Trial Ct. Tr. at 1171).
23. Corn, C. T., Docket No. 32220 on Direct Appeal, 240 S.E.2d 694
(Ga. 1977).
QUESTION: "The Jury would like to know providing the
death penalty is issued, would the person be eligible for parole
or in a case be-I believe the way the Court put it, death by
electric chair or death by imprisonment-I may exactly not
have worded it so you can understand it."
COURT: "I think what I told you was .... One is death by
electrocution .... Or the other penalty is life imprisonment."
QUESTION (JUROR): "As to parole--"
COURT: "As to matters of parole, the Court by law cannot
answer any question ...
JURY FOREMAN: "That's what we were having a problem
with."
JUROR: "That he is to die in prison and never to get out?"
JUROR: "[I]f we did say life imprisonment, we have no idea
about parole at all, right?"
COURT: "That's right."
State v. Corn (Trial Ct. Tr. at 1076-78).
24. Crawford (2d), Docket No. 44563 on Direct Appeal, 362 S.E.2d
201 (Ga. 1987).
QUESTION: "The jury would like to know, could we fix a
sentence of life imprisonment without parole?"
COURT: "Mr. Foreman, ladies and gentlemen, I charge you
that in your deliberations on the question of punishment, you
are to presume that if you sentence the Defendant to life im-
prisonment, that the Defendant will spend the rest of his life in
prison, and you are to presume that if you sentence the Defend-
ant to death, that he will be electrocuted until dead. You are to
make no other presumption."
State v. Crawford (Trial Ct. Tr. at 1664-65).
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25. Curry, W. W., Docket No. 42101 on Direct Appeal, 336 S.E.2d 762
(Ga. 1985).
QUESTION: "We wanted to know if he got a life imprison-
ment, would he be eligible for parole in seven years?"
COURT: "The question of parole is not a factor that this jury
would consider. It's not an issue for this jury to determine."
QUESTION: "Just a little bit more clarification. It says nat-
ural life. Life term it says natural life, to be imprisoned for his
natural life."
COURT: "It is a life sentence."
JUROR: "But in some time during this period, someone will
have the authority to probate it or make a decision where it
could be probated?"
COURT: "That's not an issue to decide."
State v. Curry (Trial Ct. Tr. at 1677-78).
26. Davis, JM., Docket No. 42697 on Direct Appeal, 340 S.E.2d 869
(Ga. 1986).
The jury returned with a question, and the following exchange
occurred:
JURY FOREMAN: "Your Honor, a couple of the jurors
want to know what you said a while ago is that if we vote life
imprisonment that he will serve the rest of his natural life im-
prisonment. [We want] to know what you meant by that?"
COURT: "I cannot answer that question .... Does that sat-
isfy both of you lawyers?"
JUROR COLE: "That doesn't satisfy me."
COURT: "Did you understand that I just said that I have to
abide by the law and I have given you all the law that I can give
you in this case, maam."
JUROR COLE: "May I say something, please? May I ask a
question? May I state a question to the Court?"
COURT: "Wait just a minute until I can let the Foreman ask
the question. Yes, sir. Do you have any other questions?"
JURY FOREMAN: "No, sir. That's the only question."
COURT: "All right. Now, what did you want to ask?"
JUROR COLE: "I would like for you to state, please, my
question is, will you state to this Court that as--"
COURT: "I am the Court."
JUROR COLE: "[T]hat as jurors we are not allowed to know
the law of the State of Georgia on paroles in cases of murder? I
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am not asking you, sir, to tell us anything about what will be
done in the case of Mr. Davis. We do not desire to know what
is going to be done in the case of Mr. Davis. We're asking a
point of law in any murder case. Mr. Davis may go to prison
and never be paroled."
COURT: "Wait just a minute. Wait just a minute."
JUROR COLE: "What is the law in the State of Georgia?"
COURT: "Will you wait just a minute. Don't talk when I
start talking."
JUROR COLE: "I'm sorry, sir, but I thought I was still talk-
ing when you started talking."
COURT: "All right. Now let me instruct you one more
time.... I cannot comment on the question ...."
State v. Davis (Trial Ct. Tr. at 1790-92).
27. Dick, D., Docket No. 36220 on Direct Appeal, 273 S.E.2d 124 (Ga.
1980).
The following appears in the transcript:
COURT: "Mr. Foreman and ladies and gentlemen of the
jury, I have received your question. I have reviewed your ques-
tion and I will give you this in charge. Under the law, I cannot
answer your question. Under the law, you must return a ver-
dict on the evidence you have heard and the charge of the law
as given you by the court. You are responsible for the truth of
your verdict. However, you are not responsible for its conse-
quences. That's all there is. Nothing from counsel. No expla-
nation from the court. No indication of what the question was.
But it can only have been a life sentence/parole type question."
State v. Dick (Trial Ct. Tr. at 1356).
28. Dobbs, W. W., Docket No. 30453 on Direct Appeal, 224 S.E.2d 3
(Ga. 1976).
QUESTION: "We the jury would like to know on the-say a
felony from 1 to 10 years, we would sentence them to 10 years,
would he be eligible for parole within that 10 years?"
COURT: "Now that is a question that the Court cannot com-
ment on."
State v. Dobbs (Trial Ct. Tr. at 519).
29. Dorsey, Docket No. 30983 on Direct Appeal, 230 S.E.2d 307 (Ga.
1976).
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QUESTION: "Would the Jury allow to return the sentence of
life imprisonment for the crime of murder with the stipulation
that he may never be eligible for parole or pardon[?]"
COURT: "You could enter that verdict, but the recommen-
dation would not have any effect, because the law does not pro-
vide for such a recommendation . . . . [T]he law does not
provide for such a verdict."
State v. Dorsey (Trial Ct. Tr. at 505-06).
30. Finney, E. W. (2d), Docket No. 40891 on Direct Appeal, 320 S.E.2d
147 (Ga. 1984).
JURY FOREMAN: "And one of the jurors has asked the
question, if in the event that our decision is a life decision, com-
bined with the current two life sentences that Mr. Finney's
charged-or that is he serving, would these sentences be so that
he would be eligible for parole at sometime in the future?"
COURT: "Mr. Foreman, I can't answer that question for
you. I am sorry, the law does not permit me to answer that
question. I think it's sometimes unfortunate that I can't, but
that's what they tell me and I can't. . .
State v. Finney (Trial Ct. Tr. at 859-60).
31. Gibson, S., Docket No. 30761 on Direct Appeal, 226 S.E.2d 63 (Ga.
1976).
QUESTION: "Yes sir, we're.., we need to know about life
imprisonment. We're all very well aware that you get time off
for good behavior. We were wondering that if you have two
life imprisonments running end to end,... will he spend the
rest of his life in jail?"
COURT: "I'm prohibited by law from answering that ques-
tion. I cannot tell you."
The jury returned after fifteen more minutes with a death verdict. State
v. Gibson (Trial Ct. Tr. at 434).
32. Green, R., Jr. (2d), Docket No. 36115 on Direct Appeal, 272 S.E.2d
475 (Ga. 1980).
QUESTION: "Can a sentence be given, 'Life in prison with-
out parole?'"
COURT: "I regret that I am unable to answer that question.
It would be error for me to attempt to give you anything in
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charge concerning the situation. I'm sorry but I am just simply
not able to answer your question."
State v. Green (Trial Ct. Tr. at 1135).
33. Hall, WJ., Docket No. S91P-0865 on Direct Appeal, 415 S.E.2d
158 (Ga. 1991).
QUESTIONS BY NOTE: (1) "'Is there life without parole?
[(2)] In the three life sentences, would they run concurrently or
consecutively?'"
COURT: "I think I had instructed you, and I want to repeat
my instructions for you that for the purposes of this case, de-
spite all the things you read in the newspapers and everything
else you hear, in this case life means life and death means death
.... As far as the second question,.., once again, I answer the
same question, life means life and death means death."
QUESTIONS BY NOTE: "Under Georgia law give us a defi-
nition of life in prison. Under Georgia law is there a provision
for parole to a person given a life sentence?"
COURT: "I have received the questions that you have sent
out to me which are just like the questions I got just a few
minutes ago .... There is no way that you can frame the
question so I can answer it differently."
State v. Hall (Trial Ct. Tr. at 1313-22).
34. Hance, W.H. (2d), Docket No. 41772 on Direct Appeal, 332 S.E.2d
287 (Ga. 1985).
In this case the jury persisted with several successive questions to
the judge.
QUESTIONS BY NOTE: "'(1) Does the life sentence ...
mean eligible or not eligible for parole? (A) If so, when will he
be eligible? (B) After being eligible, will the six years he's al-
ready served be counted in?'"
AFTER MUCH DISCUSSION WITH COUNSEL THE
COURT SENT BACK THE FOLLOWING NOTE: "The
Court has no comment in response to the above questions."
QUESTIONS BY NOTE: "'Pursuant to the Georgia Code,
please define the term life imprisonment-does this include a
certain amount of years? (2) Natural life?'"
THE COURT SENT BACK THE FOLLOWING
NOTE: "[T]he Court should answer the question the same
way as the previous question was asked-answered-and that
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is, ... 'The Court has no comment in response to the above
questions.' "
Forty minutes later, a death penalty verdict was returned. State v.
Hance (Trial Ct. Tr. at 1374, 1378, 1380-81).
35. Harris (Rockdale), Docket No. 5845 (no appellate decision; life sen-
tence imposed by trial judge).
QUESTION: "Several of our people had a question on what
the legal definition of life imprisonment is. There was a state-
ment in one of the other documents there that it was until the
end of the natural life, I believe, was the approximate wording.
We would just like that definition."
COURT: "Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, the law prohib-
its the Judge in the trial of this type of case to give you any
instructions on that aspect of the case as to what period of time
the defendant might be required to serve under a life sentence."
State v. Harris (Trial Ct. Tr. at 1162-63).
36. Hawes, E.M., Docket No. 32167 on Direct Appeal, 240 S.E.2d 833
(Ga. 1977).
QUESTION: "Can you put on there life and one day and he
will not be pardoned. That's what I was wondering."
COURT: "You can't do that, no."
QUESTION: "If the sentence-you know, like a life sen-
tence, after how many years will he be out?"
COURT: "I can't answer that."
QUESTION: "Judge, him being 15 years old, if he was given
a life sentence would he go to ......
COURT: "Well, I mean I can't answer-I don't know what
you're fixing to ask, but I can already tell I can't answer it."
State v. Hawes (Trial Ct. Tr. at 427).
37. Hightower, J., Docket No. S89-P0575 on Direct Appeal, 386 S.E.2d
509 (Ga. 1989).
QUESTION: "Would life sentences on each count run con-
secutively or concurrently?"
COURT: "That is a matter within the Court's discretion and
not something that I can answer at this time."
State v. Hightower (Trial Ct. Tr. at 1469).
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38. Holloway, J., Docket No. 44689 on Direct Appeal, 361 S.E.2d 794
(Ga. 1987).
QUESTION: "'Please define life imprisonment for the
jury.' "
COURT: "[C]ould you explain what the question is?"
FOREMAN: "Well, Your Honor, instead of putting any
doubts or inspirations in any of our minds; we would just like
to know what the Court defines as life imprisonment,, whether
it is the rest of Jerome's natural life. Your Honor, may I say
there were a lot of doubts in the jury's mind, and they really
wanted this question answered, if any way possible."
COURT: "I just don't think I can add to what I've already
instructed the jury."
State v. Holloway (Trial Ct. Tr. at 741-42).
39. House, J. C., Docket No. 28678 on Direct Appeal, 205 S.E.2d 217
(Ga. 1974).
QUESTION BY NOTE: "'Jury would like clarification of
judge's charge as to what the difference is for life and death.'"
The judge simply re-read the entire charge in response. State v. House
(Trial Ct. Tr. at 621-25).
40. Jarrel (2d), (new case; no docket number or appellate opinion yet).
QUESTION BY NOTE: "'What is the possibility of parole
with three life sentences?'"
COURT: "I'm not going to answer the question that you've
propounded to the Court in that matters of parole are not an
issue that the Court will charge you on .... [A]nd the Court
will not be able to answer that question."
State v. Jarrel (Trial Ct. Tr. at 2263).
41. Johnson, C. ; (new case; no docket number or appellate opinion yet).
QUESTION BY NOTE: "'[I]s this sentence life or life with-
out parole?'"
COURT: "I cannot answer that."
QUESTION BY NOTE: "'What is the average number of
years actually served? Is there any way to state this specifically
so there would never be a chance of parole?'"
COURT: "None of these questions, ladies and gentlemen, can
the Court give you any answer to. It's not permitted by law."
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State v. Johnson (Trial Ct. Tr. at 2478, 2484).
42. Krier, WL., Docket No. 37809 on Direct Appeal, 287 S.E.2d 531
(Ga. 1982).
QUESTION: "Judge, Your Honor, if we recommend life im-
prisonment, do that mean that he would be out in the next five
or seven years? These are the things that have us, you know."
COURT: "That is not a consideration for you and insofar as
your sentence is concerned, the law would simply state that all
you can determine is what I have instructed that you should
determine."
State v. Krier (Trial Ct. Tr. at 1505).
43. Lee, J., Docket No. 44930 on Direct Appeal, 365 S.E.2d 99 (Ga.
1988).
QUESTION: "Yes, sir, asking on behalf of the jury we are
concerned, just further definition of life imprisonment in terms
does this mean incarceration for life, until his death or does it
go less than that, more than that, we would like that defined
better."
COURT: "I cannot define that for you ....
State v. Lee (Trial Ct. Tr. at 675).
44. Lee, L., Docket No. 45784 on Direct Appeal, 374 S.E.2d 199 (Ga.
1988).
QUESTIONS BY NOTE: "'If Larry is sentenced life
sentences for each of the three murder counts, will they be con-
secutive or concurrent? And, secondly, is how long will it be
before he can come up for parole if he is given three life
sentences?'"
COURT: "[T]he Court tells you that such matters as are
mentioned in one of these notes is in no uncertain terms mat-
ters that are not proper for the jury's deliberations."
State v. Lee (Trial Ct. Tr. at 91-92, 104).
45. Legare, A.P. (3d), Docket No. 43259 on Direct Appeal, 348 S.E.2d
881 (Ga. 1986).




COURT: "I understand the question. But I can't answer it.
Under the Law, I am not permitted to answer that question."
State v. Legare (Trial Ct. Tr. at 1986).
46. Lindsey, J.R., Docket No. 40474 on Direct Appeal, 314 S.E.2d 881
(Ga. 1984).
QUESTION: "If we were to impose the life sentence, would
he be eligible at any time for parole?"
COURT: "I'm not going to be able to answer that question
for you because I cannot legally answer it."
A death verdict was returned after twenty more minutes of deliberation.
State v. Lindsey (Trial Ct. Tr. at 938-39).
47. Lonchar, L.G., Docket No. 45437 on Direct Appeal, 369 S.E.2d
749 (Ga. 1988).
QUESTION: "'Does life imprisonment mean-does life im-
prisonment on each count mean the sentence will be served
consecutively?'"
COURT: "Your deliberations are limited to whether this de-
fendant is sentenced to death or sentenced to life. You will as-
sume your sentence, whatever it may be, will be carried out."
State v. Lonchar (Trial Ct. Tr. Vol. 5 at 1457-60).
48. Meders, J.F., Docket No. S89-P0175 (RM) on Direct Appeal, 389
S.E.2d 320 (Ga. 1990).
QUESTION BY NOTE: "'If the jury recommends that the
accused, excused me, be sentenced to life imprisonment can the
jury recommend that the sentence be carried out without
parole?'"
COURT: The jury's question was "not proper for the jury's
consideration in any shape, form or fashion."
State v. Meders (Trial Ct. Tr. at 1337).
49. Miller, M, Docket No. 46850 on Direct Appeal, 380 S.E.2d 690
(Ga. 1989).
QUESTION: "A question has come up as to whether or not
we can have a more complete or definitive definition of what
the life sentence would entail or if we have any other options or
if we are limited to just those two decisions, the death penalty
or life imprisonment."
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The court declined to comment. State v. Miller (Trial Ct. Tr. Vol. 2 at
453).
50. Pope, JD., Docket No. 42863 on Direct Appeal, 345 S.E.2d 831
(Ga. 1986).
The record shows that the jury sent a note with two questions. The
judge did not read the questions into the record, but indicated to counsel
that they concerned parole eligibility.
COURT: "Both of the questions that you have asked me have
to do with questions of law which I cannot answer; and you
would have to decide the case without that particular
information."
State v. Pope (Trial Ct. Tr. at 1535); see also Paduano & Stafford Smith,
supra note 30, at 220-25 (discussing parole question in this case).
51. Potts, JH. (2d) (Cobb County), Docket No. S91-P0670 on Direct
Appeal, 410 S.E.2d 89 (Ga. 1991).
QUESTIONS BY NOTE: "'Does a life sentence indicate in
this particular case the possibility of parole? If not, can there
be a provision for life sentence ... without parole?'"
COURT: "I cannot respond to that question."
State v. Potts (Trial Ct. Tr. at 3738).
52. Potts, JH. (2d) (Forsyth County), Docket No. 90-V-2571 on Direct
Appeal, 376 S.E.2d 851 (Ga. 1989).
QUESTION BY NOTE: "'We would like to know if given a
life sentence, would he be eligible for parole at a later time.'"
COURT: "You shall not consider the question of parole.
Your deliberations must be limited to whether this Defendant
shall be sentenced to death, or whether he shall be sentenced to
life imprisonment. You should assume that your sentence,
whichever it may be, will be carried out."
State v. Potts (Trial Ct. Tr. at 2874, 2877).
53. Quick J., Docket No. 43584 on Direct Appeal, 353 S.E.2d 497
(Ga. 1987).
QUESTION BY NOTE: "'If we find guilt with aggravated
circumstance[s] and recommend mercy, can we also recom-
mend parole not be granted or can we recommend life and a
day or some other sentence that would preclude parole?'"
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COURT: Lengthy discussion of parole, including: "The issue
of parole, under the laws of the state of Georgia-pardon and
parole-are solely within the discretion of the State Board of
Pardons and Paroles.
Your recommendations... would not be binding on the
Department of Corrections or on the Pardon-Board of Par-
dons and Paroles."
State v. Quick (Trial Ct. Tr. at 805-07); see also Quick v. State, 353
S.E.2d 497 (Ga. 1987) (reversing death sentence on basis of above re-
sponse to parole question; leading Georgia case on this topic).
54. Redd, (lst), Docket No. 32732 on Direct Appeal, 243 S.E.2d 16
(Ga. 1978).
QUESTION: "There's a question in the minds of the jurors
pertaining to the pardon and parole provisions under current
law on the life sentence. We ask your advice on that point."
COURT: "[T]hat is a question to which the Court does not
know the answer, and it is also a question upon which the
Court is not permitted to make any comment, other than to
instruct you that it is a matter that should not enter into your
consideration or deliberation in fixing the punishment in this
case."
State v. Redd (Trial Ct. Tr. at 477).
55. Rogers, JR. (2d), Docket No. 42826 on Direct Appeal, 344 S.E.2d
644 (Ga. 1986).
QUESTIONS BY NOTE: "'Does life imprisonment mean
Mr. Rogers would be eligible for parole in seven years or less on
good behavior? Does life imprisonment mean Mr. Rogers will
be in prison until his death? Does "the remainder of his life in
the penitentiary" means [sic] that he remains until he is
dead?'"
COURT: "You are not to concern yourself with the repercus-
sions of either punishment that you fix. I cannot tell you as to
the consequences of either of your sentences that you have for
your consideration. The law provides that-that life imprison-
ment is one of the punishments that can be imposed for mur-
der. The other punishment, of course, is death. So, I cannot, in
good conscience, answer your questions as posed to me."
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The verdict was delivered thirty-four minutes later. State v. Rogers
(Trial Ct. Tr. at 2168-69).
56. Ross, E.L., Docket No. 41204 on Direct Appeal, 326 S.E.2d 194
(Ga. 1985).
QUESTIONS BY NOTE: "'What constitutes life imprison-
ment? Will he ever be eligible for any type of parole or release
program? If so, how many years?"'
COURT: "I am not permitted, under the law, to answer that
question. You must go to the jury room and make your deci-
sion on the basis of what you have already been given in
charge."
State v. Ross (Trial Ct. Tr. at 1529); see also Ross v. State, 326 S.E.2d
194, 205 (Ga. 1985) (noting prosecutor's improper comment on parole).
57. Sprouse, J (1st), Docket No. 34245 on Direct Appeal, 252 S.E.2d
173 (Ga. 1979).
QUESTION: "Your Honor, we have one question ....
Should one be sentenced to life imprisonment is that person
ever eligible for parole at anytime during that imprisonment,
and if so, when?"
COURT: "That's a matter that neither you nor I have a right
to consider at this time, sir."
State v. Sprouse (Trial Ct. Tr. at 412).
58. Sprouse, J (2d), Docket No. 38822 on Direct Appeal, 296 S.E.2d
584 (Ga. 1982).
QUESTION: "Does Georgia law provide for a life sentence
without parole?"
COURT: "Insofar as life sentence is concerned or whether
parole is concerned is not a matter for either you or the Court
or myself to consider. You all just consider the question of life
or the death penalty."
JURY FOREMAN: "This seems to clear up the rest of the
questions."
COURT: "You don't think I can be of further assistance to
you?"
JURY FOREMAN: "Well, we could ask you, sir."
COURT: "All right."
JURY FOREMAN: "When is the defendant eligible for pa-
role with the present life sentence plus twenty-five years?"
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COURT: "That is not a matter for us to consider. We have
no right to consider that."
State v. Sprouse (Trial Ct. Tr. at 363-64).
59. Stephens, W.K. (2d) (new case; no docket number or direct appeal
decision yet).
QUESTIONS BY NOTE: "[N]umber 1, '[d]oes defendant
have a chance to get out of jail if given life[?]'" Number 2,
"'[c]an we give life without parole? For example life plus fifty
years[?]' "
COURT (AFTER EXTENSIVE DISCUSSION WITH
COUNSEL): "Whatever your sentence in this case death by
electrocution or life in prison, that sentence will be imposed on
this defendant .... Life without parole is not a verdict option
under Georgia law .... [O]nly the Court has the power to
determine how [a life] sentence is to be served in conjunction
with any other sentence. .. ."
State v. Stephens (Trial Ct. Tr. at 1747-48).
60. Strickland, R. W., Docket No. 36791 on Direct Appeal, 275 S.E.2d
29 (Ga. 1981).
QUESTIONS BY NOTE: "'What assurance do we have, if
given life, the defendant will never be released on society? Or
how soon could he be considered for release?'"
COURT: "Under the law, I cannot answer either one of the
two questions that you asked."
State v. Strickland (Trial Ct. Tr. at 1161); see also Strickland v. State,
275 S.E.2d 29, 38 (Ga. 1981) (holding that flat refusal to answer parole
question is not error).
61. Thomas, A., Docket No. 55060 at Court of Appeals, 243 S.E.2d 250
(Ga. 1978).
QUESTION: "Is this jury entitled to know under the law the
conditions for parole under a recommendation for life
imprisonment?"
COURT: "No, sir. The jury is required to assume as or that
[sic] every day for which punishment is imposed will be
served."
QUESTION: "Is the jury entitled to know whether or not
these sentences will be served consecutively or concurrently?"
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COURT: "No, sir, not in connection with the function you
are now performing."
State v. Thomas (Trial Ct. Tr. at 865, 870).
62. Thomas, D. W., Docket No. 36046 on Direct Appeal, 266 S.E.2d
499 (Ga. 1980).
QUESTION BY NOTE: "'May you advise us the soonest a
person can be released if given a life sentence?'"
COURT SENT BACK A NOTE: "I am not permitted to an-
swer this question."
State v. Thomas (Trial Ct. Tr. at 569).
63. Thomas, J., Docket No. 32259 on Direct Appeal, 242 S.E.2d 1 (Ga.
1977).
QUESTIONS: "[W]e would like to know if the Defendant,
Joseph Thomas, [were given] a verdict of life imprisonment,
how long would the Defendant have to serve? Would that be
life or would he be eligible for parole?"
COURT: "I'm not permitted to comment on that at all."
State v. Thomas (Trial Ct. Tr. at 148).
64. Tucker, W., Docket No. 34814 on Direct Appeal, 261 S.E.2d 635
(Ga. 1979).
QUESTION: "Your Honor, we respectfully request clarifica-
tion as to Georgia law with respect to life imprisonment. What
is the period which must expire before one is eligible for
parole?"
COURT: "I'm sorry, ladies and gentlemen, the Court cannot
answer that question, or help you at all on that. You'll have to
retire."
State v. Tucker (Trial Ct. Tr. at 916); see also Tucker v. State, 261 S.E.2d
635, 641-42 (Ga. 1979) (discussing parole question).
65. Wade, J.L., Docket No. $90P-1631, 401 S.E.2d 701 (Ga. 1991).
QUESTIONS: "I suppose what I should ask you is can you
comment upon all the options on the sentencing other than the
two that we were presented with? Is there any other further




COURT: "Let me say this. Let's not give examples. I think I
can answer your question this way. The charge that I sent out
with you contains everything that I can say to you about sen-
tencing, and I urge you to re-read that charge."
State v. Wade (Trial Ct. Tr. at 971).
66. "West, S. T., Docket No. 40134 on Direct Appeal, 313 S.E.2d 67
(Ga. 1984).
QUESTION: "[I]f he were given a life sentence, what is the
earliest at which he would be permitted under any possible cir-
cumstances to be paroled?"
COURT: "[W]hatever verdict you render, you would assume
that that verdict is carried out, that's the only thing I can tell
you ....
State v. West (Trial Ct. Tr. at 2082).
67. Westbrook, J.M. (2d), Docket No. 43557 on Direct Appeal, 353
S.E.2d 504 (Ga. 1987).
QUESTIONS: "Can we give the sentence of life without
chance of parole? If no, when will the defendant be eligible for
parole?"
COURT: "The Judge is not permitted to answer either of
these questions."
State v. Westbrook (Trial Ct. Tr. at 1048-49); Westbrook v. State, 353
S.E.2d 504, 506 (Ga. 1987).
68. Willis,, Docket No. 34055 on Direct Appeal, 253 S.E.2d 70 (Ga.
1979).
APPELLATE OPINION STATES: "There was no error in
the trial judge's refusal to answer the jury's question as to how
long appellant would serve if sentenced to life."
Willis v. State, 253 S.E.2d 70, 75 (Ga. 1979).
69. Wright, Docket No. 42024 on Direct Appeal, 335 S.E.2d 857 (Ga.
1985).
QUESTIONS BY NOTE: 1: "If life sentence is imposed, will
the defendant be eligible for parole?" 2: "Will the defendant
definitely be in prison the rest of his entire life?"
COURT: "Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, the Court can-
not and does not answer either of those questions."
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State v. Wright (Trial Ct. Tr. at 1390, 1394).
70. Young, J., Docket No. 31932 on Direct Appeal, 236 S.E.2d 1 (Ga.
1977).
QUESTION BY NOTE: "It says, 'May I speak with Judge
Bell to clear up some questions about parole for the
defendant?'"
[Response by defense counsel states that many juries ask this
and that court is precluded from answering.]
COURT: "So I think my answer would have to be on this
that this is a matter that I cannot discuss with them. Isn't that
what you said the law is?" [Defense counsel affirmative.]
COURT: "I will just write on here and give it back."
State v. Young (Trial Ct. Tr. at 715-16).
APPENDIX II
APPENDIX II: EXCERPTS FROM JURY INTERVIEWS IN THE JAMES
RANDALL ROGERS CASE
1. JUROR DAVIS
JUROR DAVIS STATED: "Uh, some, some of 'em was con-
cerned with the uh, uh, life imprisonment-what that, that ac-
tually meant. Was, uh, you know, could you get out in seven
years on good behavior, and so on, like that."
(Davis interview at 9) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
2. JUROR SIKES
JUROR SIKES STATED: "[T]he best that we could under-
stand it, if you give him life imprisonment, being a model pris-
oner, that he could possibly be out on the streets again in seven
to twelve years ....
[W]e still all felt like there was no way for him to be back
on the streets and if there was a possibility for him being pa-
roled, then we needed to go ahead and give him the death sen-
tence ... 
(Sikes interview at 11) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
3. JUROR HAZEN
JUROR HAZEN STATED: "[T]he question that we asked
at, at the time we needed to know something, we asked the
lawyer-I mean, the judge.
Uh, whether or not life imprisonment meant life, or you
got out in seven years.
Well, we felt like that he was guilty and, uh, we felt like we
wanted to do the right thing by him. But, we did not want him
to be able to get out."
(Hazen interview at 9) (on fie with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
4. JUROR GILMER
JUROR GILMER STATED: "[W]e asked [the judge] if we
gave him life, if he would be able to get out on parole.
[W]e wanted to know if he could get out, like, in seven to
ten years on good behavior, or, on parole .... "
(Gilmer interview at 8) (on ifie with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
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5. JUROR LEMMING
JUROR LEMMING STATED: "[W]e wanted to know if life
in prison meant without parole or, or, you know, if there was a
chance for parole in ever however many years."
(Lemming interview at 8) (on file with Loyola :of Los Angeles Law
Review).
6. JUROR HYDE
JUROR HYDE STATED: "If, uhmm, what was in question
of us was if he would serve his time, if we said life sentence,
would he serve it without being paroled for the rest of his life,
you know, as far as that, not coming out on good behavior in
less than seven years is what we're talking about."
INTERVIEWER: "So, so, your intention, your jurors' [sic]
intention was to see that he not be back out in public?"
JUROR HYDE: "Yes, sir."
(Hyde interview at 10) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
7. JUROR COUCH
JUROR COUCH STATED: "[W]e had a question as to what
that statement in the law that he read us meant when it said,
uh, that the defendant would be held throughout his lifetime, or
until his death-there was something to that effect."
INTERVIEWER: "What was your concern that, a life sen-
tence wouldn't, indeed, be life-that he may be out shortly?"
JUROR COUCH: "Uh, yes, I think we were concerned as to
if, if that law meant what it said or not."
(Couch interview at 8-9) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
8. JUROR ROBBINS
JUROR ROBBINS STATED: "Uhm, some of the jurors
were wanting to know would he get out like in 7 years on good
behavior ....
... If we were gonna' put him in prison, we wanted to
make sure he would stay there. But, it, we discussed it and we
didn't really feel like he would, 'cause, uhm, there just-you
hear of it all the time happening ....
... So, it was just, we really felt like we didn't have any
alternative."





JUROR GREER STATED: "We were concerned about the
life sentence, if, if with the life sentence if that meant until he
died, or, you know could he come up for parole in so many
years."
INTERVIEWER: "How, how was that a factor?"
JUROR GREER STATED: "You mean in our decision? Be-
cause we did not want him back out."
(Greer interview at 10) (on fie with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
10. JUROR DRAKE
JUROR DRAKE STATED: "Uh, we wrote on a piece of pa-
per and asked the judge if a man had a life sentence, would he
be, would he be eligible for, for parole after seven years.
... [I]t was no problem for me to reach my decision be-
cause the boy has done spent five years and didn't like but two
more to be eligible for parole.
... I didn't feel like I wanted him to walk the street again
and probably murder someone else.
But, I was concerned about that, and of course, I, you
know, may have been willing, if the rest of the jurors, had, you
know, would have got together and say, 'O.K. This man is
guaranteed that he'll never get out of prison, and that's where
he's going to spend the rest of his days.' I may have considered
this."
(Drake interview at 13-14) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law
Review).
January 1993]
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